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THE ORIGINALIST CASE AGAINST 
CONGRESSIONAL SUPERMAJORITY VOTING 
RULES 
Dan T. Coenen 
ABSTRACT—Controversy over the Senate’s filibuster practice dominates 
modern discussion of American legislative government. With increasing 
frequency, commentators have urged that the upper chamber’s requirement 
of sixty votes to close debate on pending matters violates a majority-rule-
based norm of constitutional law. Proponents of this view, however, tend to 
gloss over a more basic question: Does the Constitution’s Rules of 
Proceedings Clause permit the houses of Congress to adopt internal 
parliamentary requirements under which a bill is deemed “passed” only if it 
receives supermajority support? This question is important. Indeed, the 
House already has such a rule in place, and any challenge to the Senate 
cloture rule is doomed from the start if that body may self-impose 
supermajority voting thresholds even for the actual enactment of laws. 
Existing scholarly work in this area, however, is incomplete. The most 
elaborate treatments invoke originalist principles to claim that the chambers 
of Congress may freely adopt supermajority (as well as submajority) bill-
voting requirements. These treatments have spawned critical responses, but 
none of them focuses in full-blown fashion on the words and deeds of the 
Framers themselves. This Article fills the resulting gap by offering a wide-
ranging argument against supermajority voting rules based on constitutional 
text, constitutional structure, and background understandings that pervaded 
the framing period. Taken as a whole, these controlling indicators of 
original meaning establish that a bill is passed if and only if it receives a 
majority vote. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2011, a bipartisan group of Senators known as the “Gang of 
Six” put forward a far-reaching plan to deal with the then-looming federal 
debt-ceiling crisis.1 One feature of their proposal called for establishment of 
annual spending caps, while another authorized departure from those caps 
only if the Senate approved that action by a vote of at least sixty-seven 
members. 
The idea of imposing congressional supermajority voting rules, without 
amending the Constitution, was not new. In 1994, pursuant to a so-called 
“Contract with America,” Republican House candidates throughout the 
nation pledged that they would, if elected, install a 60%-vote requirement to 
pass any law that increased any income tax rate.2 In fact, a Republican 
majority was swept into office, and it promptly made good on its promise 
by adopting House Rule XXI(5)(c).3 The rule specified that “[n]o bill or 
joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a Federal 
income tax rate increase shall be considered as passed or agreed to unless so 
determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting.”4 
 
1  See Press Release, Senator Saxby Chambliss, A Bi-Partisan Plan to Reduce Our Nation’s Debt and 
Deficit (July 27, 2011), available at http://chambliss.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=
ec2df064-c619-4330-97a6-4f67233dd184. 
2  CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 8 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (setting forth a 
commitment to “require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase”). 
3  See Susan Low Bloch, Congressional Self-Discipline: The Constitutionality of Supermajority 
Rules, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 1–2 (1997). 
4  The original House rule was set forth at H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. § 106(a) (1995), reprinted in 
H.R. DOC. NO. 103-342, at 658 (1995). 
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The House has since tweaked the text of this rule, but its basic requirement 
of a 60%-vote threshold remains on the books today.5 
Rule XXI(5)(c) sparked a firestorm of constitutional debate.6 Its 
defenders insisted that nothing in the Constitution blocked adoption of 
supermajority voting requirements.7 Instead, they found support for these 
requirements in Article I’s stipulation that “[e]ach House may determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings.”8 Critics shot back that Rule XXI(5)(c) offended 
the Framers’ presupposition that any bill would be deemed “passed” under 
Article I, Section 7, so long as a majority voted in its favor.9 They also 
emphasized that the new rule was “unprecedented” in imposing a 
supermajority voting requirement for the enactment of ordinary federal 
legislation.10 
This debate was noteworthy in part because of the prominence of key 
participants. Defending the rule, based on what I call the “Any-Voting-
Number Theory,” were the nation’s most prolific analysts of legislative 
supermajoritarianism, Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport.11 
 
5  The current tax-related rule, which continues to embody a supermajority-vote requirement, 
appears in clause (5)(b) of Rule XXI. H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 889–90 (2011). For simplicity’s sake, 
this Article will refer only to the original provision, Rule XXI(5)(c). H.R. DOC. NO. 103-342, at 658. 
6  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 
(1995) [hereinafter Open Letter]; Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative 
Authority: The Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 133 (1999) [hereinafter 
King, Deconstructing Gordon]; Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: 
The Framers, The Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 363 (1998) [hereinafter King, Use of Supermajority]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 
483 (1995) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport I]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of 
Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327 (1997) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport II]; Jed 
Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996). 
7  See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484. 
8  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
9  See Open Letter, supra note 6, at 1540 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 397 (James Madison) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
10  Id. at 1539; accord King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 135 (observing, following the 
adoption of Rule XXI(5)(c), that “[f]or the first time in history, more than a simple majority of members 
is now required to vote in the affirmative before certain bills are considered as ‘passed’ by a house of 
Congress”); see also Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements to Raise 
Taxes, 14 AKRON TAX J. 43, 43 (1999) (“At the opening of the 104th Congress, the new Republican 
majority imposed the first supermajority requirement ‘limited to particular cases’ in the history of 
Congress.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 9, at 397 (James Madison)). But cf. Open 
Letter, supra note 6, at 1543 (noting that the only prior deviation involved “recent innovations” initiated 
in 1985 dealing with the specialized “budget reconciliation process” in the Senate). 
11  Their writings on this subject include: John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our 
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999); 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative 
Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003); see also supra note 6 (noting other works of Professors McGinnis 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1094 
Arrayed against these advocates was a small army of no less prominent 
academics, including Professor Jed Rubenfeld, who authored the group’s 
most elaborate critique of Rule XXI(5)(c).12 
Also striking were the contending styles of argument put forward by 
these analysts. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport focused on originalist 
reasoning, emphasizing text-based inferences and background 
understandings they saw as prevailing at the time of the framing.13 Professor 
Rubenfeld also advanced textual and historical arguments,14 but his point of 
emphasis lay elsewhere.15 Decisive to him were the intolerable practical 
implications of the McGinnis-Rappaport approach. Among other things, 
according to Professor Rubenfeld, no sensible view of the Constitution 
could tolerate an outcome that would permit either chamber of Congress to 
identify any percentage of votes (be it 1%, 40%, 60%, or 100%) as 
determinative with regard to the passage of any or all bills.16 That, however, 
was just the outcome that the Any-Voting-Number Theory endorsed. 
Obscured by the nature of the Rubenfeld critique was an important 
point—namely, that the originalist argument of Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport itself is open to a powerful originalist attack. In taking on Rule 
XXI(5)(c), Professor Rubenfeld chose to focus his considerable talents in 
large measure on other matters,17 and latter-day fellow travelers have tended 
to follow his lead.18 As a result, I go in this Article where no one has gone 
 
and Rappaport). In more recent works that examine Senate filibuster rules, Professors Fisk, 
Chemerinsky, and Roberts have signaled substantial agreement with Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 242 
(1997); John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the 
Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 530 (2004). 
12  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6. Other signatories of the “Open Letter,” which set the stage for 
Professor Rubenfeld’s piece, were Professors Ackerman, Amar, Balkin, Bloch, Bobbitt, Fallon, Kahn, 
Kurland, Laycock, Levinson, Michelman, Perry, Post, Strauss, Sunstein, and Wellington. See Open 
Letter, supra note 6, at 1544. 
13  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 330–31 (focusing on “the legal and linguistic 
context of the framing,” while faulting Rubenfeld because he “appears to eschew inferences from 
history, structure, and purpose”). 
14  See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 76. 
15  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 346–47 (describing Rubenfeld’s analysis as 
“originalist or textualist” in only a “limited sense”). 
16  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 80–83. 
17  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 329 (noting that Rubenfeld’s argument focuses on 
“a variety of hypotheticals” and the “absurd consequences” of a legislative supermajority rule). 
18  See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 3, at 4 (emphasizing the “distorting impact adding supermajority 
requirements can have on the other branches”); Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 
43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1006, 1012–14 (2011) (attacking the constitutionality of the supermajority 
filibuster rule because it might lead to recognition of legislative power to entrench incumbent Senators); 
Josh Chafetz & Michael Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 245, 246 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Filibuster.pdf (Chafetz, 
Opening Statement) (“Our Constitution . . . cannot countenance this sort of self-entrenchment by 
incumbents.”); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 175–76, 181 (reasoning that arguments 
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before, by advancing a comprehensive originalist argument that the 
Constitution embodies an unyielding principle of legislative 
majoritarianism in enacting ordinary laws, which Rule XXI(5)(c) and other 
rules of its kind offend.19 
This conclusion finds support in the text, structure, and history of the 
Constitution. As to text (which is the subject of Part I) and structure (which 
is the subject of Part II), close study shows that a premise of unabridgeable 
congressional majority voting runs through much of the original 
Constitution and is compromised in no way by the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause. A look at the history of the founding period (which is the subject of 
Part III) confirms that the Framers embraced a strict norm of legislative 
majoritarianism. Indeed, the Any-Voting-Number Theory stands at odds 
with four separate elements of our constitutional history: (1) the pervasive 
acceptance in Anglo-American parliamentary practice of majority rule at 
the time of the framing, (2) then-ascendant philosophical views about the 
essential role of majority-based decisionmaking within republican systems, 
(3) the shared practical goal of ridding the new government of 
supermajority voting rules because rules of that very kind had immobilized 
the federal legislature under the Articles of Confederation, and (4) the 
Framers’ forging of key political compromises built on a binding norm of 
 
from “democracy, history, and tradition” render the McGinnis-Rappaport position “highly suspect” but 
focusing on “the practical and potential consequences of [their] position”). 
19  I pause to note four overarching points. First, modern commentators have sought to tease out 
distinctions among various theories of originalism, with particular attention being paid in recent years to 
the ratifying-community-centered concept of “original meaning.” See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (1997). The analysis presented here is fully 
consonant with that approach, and the references it makes to historical sources (such as the Philadelphia 
Convention debates, dictionaries, background theoretical writings, and THE FEDERALIST PAPERS) are 
common fare in any form of originalist exegesis.  
Second, few will be surprised to learn that justiciability doctrines may complicate judicial review of 
self-imposed congressional rules. Compare Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding 
challenges to Rule XXI(5)(c) nonjusticiable), with id. at 837–41 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (finding no 
obstacle to judicial review). Jurisdictional complexities, however, in no way diminish the significance of 
the analysis offered here. Members of Congress, no less than Justices, take oaths “to support this 
Constitution” and thus not to support rules that offend its commands. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The 
foundational constitutional issues considered here are of enduring and recurring importance, and thus the 
duty of our legislative representatives—as well as that of our courts—to honor the Constitution in 
addressing them is of enduring and recurring importance, too.  
Third, much of this Article challenges the writings of Professors McGinnis and Rappaport. But make 
no mistake about the seriousness of their work: It sets forth a detailed line of argument, which is 
couched in temperate tones. Indeed, the value of the McGinnis and Rappaport articles, as a starting point 
for analysis, is (I hope) brought into focus by this piece.  
Finally, while the work of Professor Rubenfeld and others does not focus to the extent this Article 
does on originalist reasoning, it contains much material that reinforces the argument made here. 
Concerns about absurd results, for example, have a role to play in any originalist inquiry. See infra note 
196 and accompanying text. There can be no doubt, then, that this Article builds in important respects on 
the earlier work of Professor Rubenfeld and the other critics of the McGinnis-Rappaport approach. 
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congressional majoritarianism, including the Great Compromise on large-
state and small-state power. 
The analysis offered here is important in and of itself. It is all the more 
important, however, because it bears on related issues, including the 
constitutionality of the Senate’s long-disputed treatment of filibusters. 
According to that body’s cloture rule, the agreement of sixty senators is 
required to end debate on most pending matters.20 Critics of this rule have 
challenged its constitutionality on the ground that it is functionally 
indistinguishable from a supermajority voting rule.21 This argument, in turn, 
has stirred forceful rebuttals, including in Senate hearings conducted in 
2010,22 as well as in a recent scholarly exchange between Professors 
Chafetz and Gerhardt.23 
This Article is linked to the escalating controversy over the filibuster in 
two ways. The first linkage arises because no argument against the sixty-
vote cloture rule based on the norm of legislative majoritarianism can 
succeed if no such norm exists. Establishing the existence of this principle 
is therefore an indispensible precondition to launching a constitutional 
attack on the Senate’s cloture practice. The second linkage is more subtle 
but no less important. In the end, the success of any challenge to the Senate 
filibuster system will hinge not only on the existence of a fixed norm of 
legislative majoritarianism, but also on that norm’s robustness. This Article 
seeks to show that the case for recognizing this mandate is so strong that 
there remains little, if anything, left to be said for the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory. A constitutional principle of this vigor clearly undoes Rule 
XXI(5)(c). And, precisely because of its potency, this same principle casts 
an ominous shadow over analogues of that rule, including the Senate’s 
supermajority-based filibuster regime. 
I. SUPERMAJORITY VOTING RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution specifies that “[e]very Bill 
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
shall . . . be presented to the President.”24 If a bill receives a majority vote 
within a chamber, has it “passed” for purposes of this clause? The argument 
for the Any-Voting-Number Theory begins with the thought that the 
Constitution does not address this question in pointedly express terms, and 
in particular does not specify that the House and Senate may not impose on 
themselves nonmajority voting rules under the Rules of Proceedings 
 
20  U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, 
at 21 (2011) (Rule XXII(2)). 
21  See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 247–48. 
22  Examining the Filibuster: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
23  See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18. 
24  U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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Clause.25 This would-be argument is, however, unpersuasive because many 
requirements that our Constitution imposes are not set forth in pointedly 
express terms. The Fifth Amendment, for example, nowhere specifies that 
regulatory interferences with property may qualify as takings under a 
multifactor balancing test,26 and the First Amendment does not on its face 
speak of special rules that target “public fora”27 or “prior restraints.”28 In 
these and many other instances, however, the Supreme Court has 
recognized constitutional “sub-rules” that constrain government action in 
light of the history and purpose of the relevant clause.29 Not surprisingly, 
proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory acknowledge the existence 
of many rules of this kind. Citing background understandings that prevailed 
in 1788, for example, they argue that Article I’s grant of “legislative power” 
bars entrenchment of laws over time, even when Congress acts pursuant to 
one of its enumerated powers.30 By symmetry of logic, if governing 
interpretative principles indicate that “passed” when standing alone means 
“voted for by a majority,” these interpretive principles must be honored so 
as to trump any otherwise operative authority granted by the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause.31 
 
25  See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484 (“The Open Letter fails to identify a 
constitutional clause that prohibits the three-fifths rule.”). 
26  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (identifying 
several factors for determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment). 
27  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (noting the “stringent standards [the Court has] 
established for restrictions on speech in traditional public fora”). 
28  See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (noting that the Court has interpreted 
the First Amendment to afford “special protection” to orders that impose a “‘prior’ restraint” on speech). 
29  See Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” 
Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2835, 2855–56 (2009). 
30  Indeed, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport advocate recognition of similarly extrapolated rules 
that are said to constrain the chambers’ power to determine how bills are passed under the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause. They would not uphold House rules, for example, that give a veto to a nonmember, 
McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 332–35, that preclude certain members from voting on 
certain bills (except apparently where the veto is on a matter as to “which [the member] is immediately 
and particularly interested”), id. at 332 n.27 (internal quotation mark omitted), that condition one 
chamber’s enactment of a bill on enactment by the other chamber, id. at 338–40, or that “confer[] one 
vote on some Members while providing more than one vote to other Members,” id. at 333 n.28. None of 
these limits is, however, expressly stated in the Constitution. 
31  See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (holding that, in promulgating rules, Congress 
“may not . . . ignore constitutional restraints”). Indeed, not infrequently, the Court has imposed limits on 
Congress based on the Constitution’s “essential postulate[s],” Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
U.S. 313, 322 (1934), rather than its explicit terms. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 
54, 72 (1996) (endorsing a nontextual limit on congressional power to expose states to suit in federal 
court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (extending this principle to state court actions). In 
such cases, the Court has looked beyond particular textual passages to “historical understanding and 
practice” and “the structure of the Constitution.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898, 905 (1997). 
Of particular importance with respect to the norm of majority voting, the Court has rooted some 
constitutional restrictions of this kind in controlling background assumptions about republican self-
government. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 819 (1995) (applying an 
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In fact, even when read in isolation, the “passed” language of Article I 
points toward a mandate of majority voting for at least three reasons. First, 
well-settled practice in the framing period—and thus the common 
understanding of the time—equated the passing of laws with a majority 
vote, unless a Constitution or Constitution-like text provided to the 
contrary.32 Second, even the most ardent proponents of the Any-Voting-
Number Theory acknowledge that the word “passed” carries with it a 
default rule of legislative majoritarianism.33 But if the term “passed” 
denotes “voted for by a majority” in the absence of a contrary rule, it seems 
entirely reasonable to say it denotes “voted for by a majority” without more. 
Third, at least two early dictionaries include definitions that associate the 
word “pass” with receipt of a majority vote.34 Of particular significance, a 
portion of the law-related definition of “pass” provided by Noah Webster in 
1828 was “to receive the sanction of a legislative house or body by a 
majority of votes.”35 To be sure, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport point 
to other dictionary entries that do not mention a majority vote, including 
Samuel Johnson’s definition of “pass” as meaning only “[t]o be enacted.”36 
A definition that equates “passed” with “enacted,” however, is not at all 
inconsistent with a principle of majority voting, particularly in light of other 
 
“egalitarian theme” and a “critical foundation for the constitutional structure” to void state-created 
candidate qualifications); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (rejecting congressional 
power to exclude elected members who meet constitutionally stipulated qualifications based on a 
“fundamental principle of our representative democracy . . . ‘that the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them’” (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 257 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 1836) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (statement of Alexander Hamilton))); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 
545 (1934) (drawing on the holding of Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (stating that 
democratic elections must allow “the free and uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take 
part in that choice” in recognizing an implied federal power to regulate presidential elections)); see also 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428–29 (1819) (recognizing nontextual immunity of federal 
instrumentalities from state taxation in large part because the federal citizenry is not fairly represented in 
any single state’s legislature); cf. Roberts, supra note 11, at 540–41 (noting that although the “anti-
entrenchment principle does not appear as such in the Constitution,” it is rightly implied because it 
comports with “common understanding” and “lies at the heart of our representative democracy”). The 
bottom line is apparent: If there exists a “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that 
endorses legislative majority rule, Powell, 395 U.S. at 547, that principle—even if nontextual in 
nature—must operate to delimit congressional authority, including under the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause.  
32  See infra Part III.A.1.  
33  See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
34  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 77 (“When a legislative bill is finally assented to by a majority 
vote of the body . . . , it is said to be ‘passed’ by such body . . . .” (omissions in original) (quoting 2 
STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 935 § 4 
(Jersey City, Frederick D. Dinn & Co. 1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); infra note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
35  2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 31 (New York, S. 
Converse 1828); see also McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 343 n.72 (noting this text).  
36  McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 342 (alteration in original). 
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early dictionary definitions that tellingly associate the word “majority” with 
the enactment of laws.37 At the least, then, the word “passed” may be read 
as an originalist matter to carry with it the idea of approval by majority 
vote. And the large body of evidence set forth below signals that that 
definition is significantly more plausible than reading the word to mean 
something like “approved by whatever number of members the chamber 
designates for itself by rule either for all bills or any particular groups of 
bills at any given time.” 
This large body of evidence supports a wide-ranging argument for 
rejecting the Any-Voting-Number Theory. That argument begins with the 
constitutional text itself, in keeping with the settled proposition that the 
document’s terms must always be read in light of the company they keep.38 
The Constitution, for example, nowhere states that federal courts may 
nullify acts of Congress. In Marbury v. Madison,39 however, the Court 
extrapolated this authority from the collaborative operation of three 
interlocking pieces of the Framers’ handiwork: (1) the grant of federal 
jurisdiction over cases “arising under the constitution,” (2) the identification 
of the Constitution as “the supreme law of the land,” and (3) the vesting in 
the federal courts of “judicial power.”40 Here, in like fashion, the “passed” 
language of Article I does not stand alone. Indeed, the fixed norm of 
legislative majoritarianism that this language reifies is so deeply woven 
through the fabric of the Constitution that it finds support in no fewer than 
seven separate clauses.41 We turn now to the most informative of those 
 
37  See, e.g., 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (London, His Majesty’s 
Law Printers 1771) (defining “majority” as including the following: “The only method of determining 
the acts of many is by a majority; the major part of members of parliament enact laws . . . .”); GILES 
JACOB, THE NEW LAW DICTIONARY 354 (London, Henry Lintot 1743) (including in the definition of 
“majority” that “it is the Majority of Members of Parliament, which enact our Laws”). 
38  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 347 (emphasizing that “whenever a provision is 
ambiguous, we properly read it in light of the rest of the document” and that “[s]ometimes other specific 
provisions shed light on a dispute over the meaning of a particular clause”). 
39  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
40  Id. at 173, 178–80 (emphasis omitted). 
41  The sentence in the text refers to no fewer than “seven separate clauses” because several 
provisions, in addition to the three clauses identified in the following sentence and discussed in detail in 
the remainder of this Part, work against the Any-Voting-Number Theory. Those clauses include the 
Quorum Clause, see infra note 45, the House and Senate Composition Clauses, see infra note 184, and 
the Appointment and Qualifications Clauses, see infra note 187 and accompanying text. The case for a 
fixed constitutional rule of legislative action may also gain ground by reading the term “passed” in pari 
materia with Article I, Section 1’s vesting in Congress of the “legislative power” in light of historical 
understandings that that power was to be wielded by majority vote. See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra 
note 6, at 345 (relying on “fundamental” understandings and “writings at the time of the Framing” to 
root the anti-entrenchment principle in Article I’s grant of “legislative power”). Finally, as one 
commentator has argued at length, the case against the Any-Voting-Number Theory may find additional 
support in the words of Article I, Section 3, which specifies that “each Senator shall have one vote.” See 
Michael J. Teter, Equality Among Equals: Is the Senate Cloture Rule Unconstitutional?, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 547, 553–54 (2010). Because these other clauses offer less direct support for the norm of majority 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1100 
clauses: (1) the term that establishes a two-thirds vote as determinative for 
purposes of overriding presidential vetoes,42 (2) the clause that grants the 
Vice President a tiebreaking power when the Senate is “equally divided,”43 
and (3) the five specialized provisions in the original Constitution that 
impose supermajority voting requirements only in highly exceptional 
contexts.44 These provisions, especially in their joint operation, cut sharply 
against the Any-Voting-Number Theory.45 
 
voting than the clauses identified in the next sentence, they are not given extensive attention in this 
Article. Even so, it merits emphasis that they reinforce the textual case against the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory. 
42  U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2. 
43  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
44  See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
45  Supporters of the Any-Voting-Number Theory also seek support in the constitutional text, but 
their arguments are not convincing. They point, in particular, to the clause that states that “a Majority of 
each [chamber] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business,” U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1, claiming that the 
Framers’ express establishment of a fixed majority quorum rule establishes by negative implication the 
lack of a fixed majority voting rule for acting on bills because that subject received no similarly targeted 
treatment in the constitutional text. See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 487. This argument 
misses the mark. As Professor Amar has explained, specification of a clarifying quorum rule made 
perfect sense because preexisting “state constitutions and British practice had varied widely on the 
quorum question.” AKHIL REED AMAR, DRAFT BOOK (forthcoming Sept. 2012) (manuscript at 438 n.34) 
(on file with author). In contrast, there already existed in 1787 a well-settled practice of majority-
controlled legislative voting, absent constitutional specification to the contrary. Thus, constitutional 
clarification was necessary in the former context but needless in the latter. See King, Deconstructing 
Gordon, supra note 6, at 180–81. In fact, the Quorum Clause strongly supports a fixed norm of 
legislative majoritarianism. Why? Because its central purpose was to safeguard majority-based 
legislative decisionmaking by preempting the “baneful practice” under which minorities would block 
majority action by simply not showing up. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 9, at 397 (James 
Madison). For this reason, the Quorum Clause, as Joseph Story explained, helps undergird the principle 
of dominant significance here—namely, that “to give the rule to the minority, instead of the majority” is 
“to subvert the fundamental principle of a republican government.” 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 833, at 296 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) 
(making this point in analyzing the Quorum Clause); see also Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate 
Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 467, 487 (2011) (“Both Madison and the 
Supreme Court [in Ballin] saw the Quorum Clause as instantiating majority rule.”).  
Along the same lines, the Electoral College Clause (which was altered by the Twelfth Amendment, 
but in no way that is significant here) spoke of the need in presidential voting to secure “a Majority of 
the whole Number of Electors” and, failing that, a “Majority of all the States” as represented in the 
House. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. These references to majority voting in no way tend to prove that 
majority voting is not required in passing bills. Again, as Professor Amar has explained, 
preconstitutional practice was far from well settled in this context, and those uncertainties were greatly 
magnified, to say the least, for the Philadelphia delegates because nothing like the Electoral College had 
previously been seen on the face of the earth. AMAR, supra (manuscript at 438 n.34). By way of 
example, it is noteworthy that Article I requires the vote of an absolute majority of whole membership of 
the House in selecting the President when the electoral-college system fails to pick a winner. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. This specification made sense precisely because it departed from the otherwise-
governing majority-of-a-quorum rules applicable to enacting legislation. In short, “majority rule did not 
go without saying” when it came to the Electoral College’s picking of Presidents, although it did go 
without saying in the enactment of ordinary legislation. AMAR, supra. 
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A. The Presentment Clause 
The textual case against the Any-Voting-Number Theory draws in part 
on language that lies almost right beside the term “passed” in the 
Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7. According to that clause, as we 
have seen, “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be 
presented to the President.”46 The Presentment Clause, however, does not 
stop there. It goes on to provide that, if the President thereafter disapproves 
the bill, “he shall return it” to the chamber in which it originated.47 Then, 
“[i]f . . . two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be 
sent . . . to the other House, . . . and if approved by two thirds of that House, 
it shall become a Law.”48 
The Any-Voting-Number Theory runs headlong into the logically 
sequenced legislative process that the full text of the Presentment Clause 
lays down. Under that theory, after all, each chamber of Congress can 
require a three-quarters or four-fifths or even a unanimous vote for the 
initial passing of any law. At the same time, that theory would not permit 
the chambers to require more than a two-thirds vote to override a veto 
because Article I definitively specifies that, if “two thirds of [both houses] 
shall agree to pass” an unsigned bill, “it shall become a Law.”49 Does the 
Constitution really permit the House and the Senate to require a greater 
percentage of votes to pass a bill in the first instance than the Framers 
themselves established as the single, fixed percentage of votes needed to 
override the President’s rejection of a thus-passed measure? The answer 
must be no, because otherwise Congress could require a greater vote for the 
ordinary act of passing legislation than for the extraordinary act of 
repudiating a presidential veto.50 
 
46  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. (emphasis added). 
50  This conclusion is bolstered by the Presentment Clause’s indication that the President is to have a 
meaningful role in the bill-enactment process. This is so because, as a practical matter, the Any-Voting-
Number Theory would permit Congress to “render[] the President’s concurrence a virtual formality” by 
effectively ensuring an override even if a veto occurred. Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 84; see also 
Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1014 (agreeing that “it would be structurally strange to allow the Senate to 
impose a higher threshold for passing ordinary legislation than for passing a proposed constitutional 
amendment or voting to override a presidential veto”). Notably, the Convention debates support this 
conclusion. Early on, some delegates voiced support for an absolute presidential veto. 1 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98–103 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 
FARRAND] (noting the effort of James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton “to give the Executive an 
absolute negative on the laws”). That approach was abandoned, however, after George Mason of 
Virginia advocated the current system, under which vetoes could be overridden, but only “by a greater 
majority than was required in the first instance.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added) (statement of George 
Mason). 
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Faced with this roadblock, some commentators who would 
countenance departures from majority-based voting on bills have advanced 
what might be called the Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory. These 
analysts acknowledge that the Presentment Clause cannot permit the House 
and Senate to require more votes to present a bill to the President than to 
override the President’s post-presentment veto.51 Thus, they say, the House 
and the Senate may adopt supermajority voting rules for passing laws, but 
only if those rules do not push beyond a two-thirds voting-rule ceiling.52 
This limit, so the argument goes, removes any incongruity between the 
authority granted by the Rules of Proceedings Clause and the numerical 
mandates of Article I, Section 7. 
The difficulty with this effort to reconcile the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory with the text of Article I is that it carries the seeds of its own 
demise. The argument, after all, embraces the idea that the constitutional 
text does constrain, by implication, the supposed power of the House and 
the Senate to impose on themselves supermajority voting requirements 
under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. If there is to be such an implication, 
however, there is strong reason to say that it should not be one that gives 
rise to a peculiar and unprecedented principle under which any or all bills 
may be passed by votes of 1% (or 51%) to 66.7% (or 66.7% minus one 
vote).53 Rather, the better implication is the one supported by simplicity, 
history, and long-accepted practice—namely, that a bill is “passed” if, but 
only if, it receives a majority vote.54 In short, the full text of the Presentment 
 
51  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 240–42. 
52  See id.; accord Robert S. Leach, House Rule XXI and an Argument Against a Constitutional 
Requirement for Majority Rule in Congress, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997). 
53  This strange range of numerical possibilities itself suggests the unwisdom of embracing the 
Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory. Some adherents of that theory say, for example, that all voting 
rules are fine, including submajority voting rules. See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 489–90, 
490 n.38. (Thus the reference to 1%.) Others may lack the temerity to endorse submajority rules, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s seeming repudiation of them. See infra notes 132–34, 188 and 
accompanying text. (Thus the reference to 51%.) In addition, it is unclear what the top-end voting 
number under the Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory should be. Some might say that the number 
cannot exceed the voting number required to overturn a veto. (Thus the reference to 66.7%.) Others will 
find it unacceptable to permit the same voting rule for the ordinary passage of laws as for the 
extraordinary overriding of vetoes. (Thus, the reference to 66.6% minus one.) It is hard to believe that 
the founders of our nation meant for interpreters of the Constitution to engage in such elaborate 
homework in applied mathematics. 
54  Indeed, there is another math-related problem with the Almost-Any-Voting-Number Theory. 
Although prohibiting rules that require more than a two-thirds vote for passing bills, nothing in the logic 
of the theory would outlaw, for example, a Senate rule that requires confirmation of presidential 
appointees by a 70%, 80%, or 90% vote. There is no indication, however, that the Framers had in mind 
such structure-tilting numerical extremities—and in particular the strange possibility that the Senate 
could self-impose a stricter supermajority rule for confirming appointees than for passing laws, thereby 
radically altering the power of presidents to select their key subordinates. See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 
831, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (highlighting this difficulty). 
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Clause—when read as a whole in light of the most straightforward practical 
reasoning—creates grave difficulties for the Any-Voting-Number Theory.55 
B. The Vice President Voting Clause 
The norm of mandatory legislative majoritarianism also finds support 
in Article I, Section 3’s specification that “[t]he Vice President of the 
United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, 
unless they be equally divided.”56 According to the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory, this clause sets forth nothing more than a “default rule,” so that the 
Vice President may cast a tiebreaking vote only when the Senate has not 
established its own nonmajority voting requirement.57 This argument falters, 
however, because the provision simply does not read as a default rule. 
To begin with, the clause presupposes that legally consequential tie 
votes will occur—a result that, under a default-rule reading, the Senate can 
defeat simply by adopting a generally applicable supermajority or 
submajority voting rule.58 The clause also declares that the Vice President 
“shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided,” thus implying that he 
“shall have” a vote if in fact the Senate “be equally divided.”59 Against this 
 
55  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 438) (relying largely on the text’s treatment of veto 
overrides in concluding that “Article I presupposed that each house would ‘pass’ legislative bills by 
majority vote”). 
56  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
57  McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488; accord Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 
241. 
58  Indeed, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, Hamilton declared that it was “necessary” to give the Vice 
President a tiebreaking vote so as to ensure “a definitive resolution of the body.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
68, supra note 9, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton). Describing such a power grant as “necessary,” however, 
is difficult to square with a legal regime in which the Vice President need not be given a vote at all. See 
King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 182 n.226. Even more to the point are the observations of 
Justice Joseph Story. He explained, in his great treatise, that the Vice President Voting Clause was 
adopted because, “if no casting vote were allowed” when the body was evenly split, “then the indecision 
and inconvenience might be very prejudicial to the public interests.” 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 736, at 
211. Under these circumstances, he continued, “the vice president would seem to be the most fit arbiter 
to decide, because he would be the representative, not of one state only, but of all.” Id. (emphasis 
added). Focusing on these points, Justice Story attributed to the Framers the understanding that “[i]n all 
questions before the senate he might safely be appealed to, as a fit arbiter upon an equal division.” Id. 
§ 735, at 210 (emphasis added). Viewing the Vice President as “the most fit arbiter” in “all questions 
before the senate” does not jibe with a legal regime under which the Senate may freely render him not 
the arbiter in tie-vote cases either in part or in whole. Yet that is exactly the regime that the Any-Voting-
Number Theory seeks to attribute to the Framers and to do so in the absence of any supportive framing-
era evidence. 
59  See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 537 (statement of Roger Sherman) (assuming that the 
Senate’s presiding officer would have no vote “unless when an equal division of votes might happen”); 
LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ¶ 298, at 115 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856) (recognizing that 
the Vice President “shall give the casting vote, when the body over which he presides is equally 
divided”); see also 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
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backdrop, the Any-Voting-Number Theory cannot possibly be given full 
sway. Consider a Senate rule that specifies that a bill passes only if it 
receives fifty-one votes from then-sitting Senators. Such a rule would be 
unconstitutional on its face because, under it, even when the Senate stood 
“equally divided” in a 50–50 deadlock, the Vice President would be 
divested of his constitutionally mandated and determinative vote.60 And if 
the Senate cannot install a 51-vote requirement in keeping with the internal 
structure of the Vice President Voting Clause, there is no apparent reason 
why it should be able to install a 52-vote requirement, or a 60-vote 
requirement, or a 67-vote requirement. 
Again, the key point is apparent. The text of the Vice President Voting 
Clause comports most logically with the Framers’ endorsement of a 
straightforward and fixed norm of legislative majoritarianism.61 Indeed, the 
Clause fits together with this norm in a distinctly compelling and elegant 
way by establishing that outcomes in the Senate are to be decided by 
majority vote—with the outcome in exceptional cases to turn on the 
majority’s will as determined by the majority-creating action of the body’s 
presiding officer.62 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D, at 224–25 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young 
Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER] (describing the Vice President’s tiebreaking voting 
power as “a very important trust”); cf. Henry Barrett Learned, Casting Votes of the Vice-Presidents, 
1789–1915, 20 AM. HIST. REV. 571, 571 (1915) (noting that through 1915 “there appear to have been 
179 instances of the use of the casting vote by the Vice-President in the Senate”). See generally Adrian 
Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 400–01 & 
n.119 (2004) (noting “the framers’ decision to grant the vice president a tiebreaking vote” and 
describing it as a “significant power”).  
60  A nitpicking critic might challenge this statement on the ground that the Vice President does 
“have” a “vote” in this setting, even though the vote has no effect. There are, however, two key 
difficulties with this stance. First, it is no easy thing to say (at least with a straight face) that the Vice 
President has a “vote” when that supposed vote involves an utterly meaningless act. Second, this 
characterization of Article I, Section 3 offends the whole sense of the Clause, which is that the Vice 
President’s follow-up vote in the event of a tie will not only be meaningful, but meaningful in a 
powerful and dramatic sense in light of its decisive, tiebreaking quality. 
61  The textual context in which the founders granted the tiebreaking power further supports this 
conclusion. To begin with, the tiebreaking power is one of only two powers given to the Vice President 
in the entire original Constitution, with the other involving the power of the Vice President to preside 
over the Senate. It thus seems a matter of no little ambitiousness to say that fully half of the 
constitutionally vested powers of this nationally selected officer may be entirely stripped away by the 
unilateral action of the very body over which he is to preside. In addition, given the Constitution’s 
command that the Vice President “shall preside” over the Senate, that body plainly could not provide by 
rule that some person other than the Vice President should be its presiding officer. In its nature, then, 
Article I, Section 3 puts a designated-presiding-officer limitation on the Senate’s “Rules of Proceedings” 
power, which it then marries in a single sentence with the intimately related authority to break tie votes. 
The close functional and textual kinship between these two powers gives reason to conclude that the 
latter, like the former, is not freely removable by way of Senate rule. 
62  This conclusion is emphatically confirmed by the well-recognized historical purpose of the Vice 
President Voting Clause. As the Framing generation recognized, that purpose was to give the Vice 
President “the casting vote” in his capacity as President of the Senate. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 
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C. The Enumeration of Supermajority Voting Rules 
A third textual problem for the Any-Voting-Number Theory stems 
from the Constitution’s specification of five situations—and only five 
situations—in which the House or Senate is to act by supermajority vote: 
when either house expels a duly elected member,63 when the Senate 
convicts Presidents or other high officers on impeachment charges,64 when 
the Senate ratifies a treaty,65 when the chambers put forward constitutional 
amendments for action by the states,66 and (as we already have seen) when 
the chambers act to overturn presidential vetoes.67 Not surprisingly, 
adherents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory ascribe to this enumeration 
only the narrowest of negative implications. They say that the listing means 
merely that interpreters may not derive from the “Constitution itself” any 
 
31, at 489–90 (statement of James Monroe) (“[The Vice President] is to succeed the President, in case of 
removal, disability, &c. [sic], and is to have the casting vote in the Senate”); accord Remarks of Robert 
Whitehill to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 512 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY] (noting that the Vice President “has the casting vote in the Senate”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, 
supra note 9, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the Vice President “should have only a casting 
vote”); see also TUCKER, supra note 59 (recognizing that the Vice President “is entrusted with” the 
“casting vote”); WILLIAM SMITH, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL 
STATES WITH EACH OTHER, AND WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (Philadelphia, John Thompson 
1796) (noting general state practice under which the presiding officer of the legislative house “has only 
the casting vote”); 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 736, at 211 (discussing the Vice President’s 
constitutionally vested power in terms of “a casting vote”). As Noah Webster made clear in his 1828 
dictionary, the “casting-vote” was then understood to mean “[t]he vote of a presiding officer, in an 
assembly or council, which decides a question, when the votes of the assembly or house are equally 
divided between the affirmative and negative.” 1 WEBSTER, supra note 35, at 33.  
The Any-Voting-Number Theory simply cannot be squared with the Framers’ design to give the 
Vice President the casting vote power. After all, the most immediate effect of supermajority voting rules 
is to render tie votes irrelevant, including for the Vice President. Such rules thus necessarily strip that 
officer of the “deciding” vote, 1 WEBSTER, supra, at 33 (definition of “casting”), or the “decisive” vote, 
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 956 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (definition of 
“casting”), that—as a basic definitional matter—the Framers’ vesting of “the casting vote” was meant to 
create. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 133 (Washington, Joseph Milligan & William Cooper 1812) (“In 
Senate, if they be equally divided, the Vice-President announces his opinion, which decides.”).  
63  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
64  Id. § 3, cl. 6. 
65  Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
66  Id. art. V. 
67  Amendments to the Constitution set forth two more supermajority voting rules. One bars one-
time government servants who had joined the Confederacy from assuming important positions in the 
federal government absent supermajority clearance. See id. amend. XIV, § 3. Another permits Congress 
by a two-thirds vote to uphold a disability-based suspension of the President initiated by the Vice 
President and the cabinet. See id. amend. XXV, § 4. These provisions are of a piece with the 
Impeachment and Expulsion Clauses because they involve critical personnel matters concerning high 
government officials. At the least, they do not involve anything remotely like the enactment of ordinary 
laws. 
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further supermajority voting mandates.68 The gist of this reasoning is that 
there is no inescapable logical necessity to conclude that the Framers’ 
itemization of five supermajority voting rules forecloses the option of self-
imposing additional rules of that kind.69 Thus, the five exceptions constitute 
only a “minimal list” to which each chamber may freely add.70 
The difficulty with this argument is that the negative-implication-based 
interpretive principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of 
inescapable logical necessity; rather, it is a rule of “sensible inference.”71 
And in keeping with that sensible-inference approach, the Court has not 
hesitated to apply the expressio unius principle to deem textual itemizations 
exclusive in dealing with interpretive issues closely parallel to the one 
considered here.72 Indeed, this approach has controlled analysis in such 
landmark rulings about constitutional structure as Marbury v. Madison,73 
Powell v. McCormack,74 and INS v. Chadha.75 
Chadha illustrates the point. There, Congress claimed a power to pass 
laws that would permit either chamber to overturn agency actions, made 
pursuant to a statutory delegation of authority, by way of a unicameral 
override.76 The challenger argued that these “legislative vetoes” violated the 
Presentment Clause because they involved congressional interventions 
undertaken without adherence to the constitutional requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment.77 In dissent, Justice White rightly noted that 
the constitutional text did not “directly . . . prohibit the legislative veto” 
when issued pursuant to a law that itself had run the gauntlet of enactment 
by both houses and submission to the President.78 The majority, however, 
 
68  McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 328 n.9. 
69  See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488; accord Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1014 
(noting that the analysis of Professors McGinnis and Rappaport focuses on what is “logically possible”); 
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 241 (finding significance of the itemization in what the words 
“necessarily mean” so as not to render them “superfluous”). 
70  Bloch, supra note 3, at 4. 
71  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002). 
72  See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 527 n.95. 
73  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discussed infra note 84). 
74  395 U.S. 486 (1969) (discussed infra note 85). 
75  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
76  Id. at 944. 
77  Id. at 967. 
78  Id. at 977 (White, J., dissenting); accord, e.g., Bloch, supra note 3, at 2. For this reason, 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport gloss over an important complexity in asserting that “Chadha 
provides no guidance” because there “the Constitution contain[ed] . . . a requirement” of bicameralism 
and presentment. See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 492. The problem with this assertion 
lies in its conclusory nature, because the whole question in Chadha was whether the Constitution 
required bicameralism and presentment in the context of legislative vetoes. To repeat: the question in 
Chadha was conceptually the same as the question presented here—namely, whether generally 
applicable constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment had enough of a default-rule 
character to permit Congress to remove those steps when acting pursuant to a previously enacted law. 
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rejected the idea that Congress could empower itself to take later 
unicameral action even in this distinctive setting, emphasizing in so ruling 
that there are only “four provisions in the Constitution, explicit and 
unambiguous, by which one House may act alone.”79 
The underlying logic of the Any-Voting-Number Theory conflicts with 
the underlying logic of Chadha. In that case, the Court did not focus solely 
on inescapable logical necessity in evaluating the significance of the “four 
provisions” on which it relied. If the Court had, it would have concluded 
that the four-part enumeration signaled only that interpreters could not find 
in the “Constitution itself” any fifth or sixth or seventh authorization of 
unicameral legislative action.80 The Court, however, eschewed that route, 
thus rejecting the narrow view of the expressio unius principle on which the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory is built. According to the Court in Chadha, 
because the text-based constitutional exceptions were “narrow, explicit, and 
separately justified,” the claimed “[c]ongressional authority” to add to these 
exceptions “is not to be implied.”81 The logic of Chadha applies here. The 
Constitution’s specification of “carefully defined exceptions” to a generally 
operative lawmaking norm—there, bicameralism and presentment; here, 
majority voting—signals that subconstitutional creation of additional 
exceptions is, as the Court declared in Chadha, “not authorized by the 
constitutional design.”82 
At the least, Chadha confirms the rightness of applying the expressio 
unius principle with a high level of seriousness when efforts are made to 
depart from standard lawmaking processes. And in light of that approach, it 
is no small matter that four special reasons counsel application of the 
expressio unius principle here. First, the Framers’ singling out of only a 
circumscribed set of supermajority voting rules suggests on its face a plan 
to mark out exceptions from how Congress will operate in ordinary 
practice. According to the Any-Voting-Number Theory, however, the two 
houses of Congress may craft supermajority voting rules that cover each 
and every action they might take, thus causing the Framers’ exceptions not 
 
79  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 (footnote omitted). 
80  See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
81  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956 (emphasis added). 
82  Id. This conclusion is confirmed by evidence drawn from the Philadelphia Convention itself. At 
the Convention, John Dickinson specifically asserted that if the constitutional text were to set forth a 
limited number of qualifications for holding office, such a “partial [list] would by implication tie up the 
hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions” in that list by later imposing additional 
qualifications. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 123 (statement of John Dickinson). Particularly 
because Dickinson was a leading lawyer of his day, see DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: 
THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 33, 63 (2007), his understanding of the operation of the 
expressio unius principle provides a strong indicator of the Constitution’s original meaning. And if a 
limited listing of qualifications would “by implication” bar the houses of Congress from promulgating 
additional qualifications, then there is good reason to conclude that a limiting listing of supermajority 
voting requirements should likewise “by implication” bar the houses from promulgating additional 
supermajority voting rules. 
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to operate as exceptions at all.83 Second (as we have already seen), the case 
for viewing the textual itemization as exclusive is bolstered by features of 
the constitutional text that reach well beyond the enumeration itself.84 Third 
(as we will soon see), the inference of exclusivity is reinforced in this 
setting by a rich body of historical evidence.85 
Finally, the matters that the Framers singled out for supermajority 
voting requirements—such as presidential impeachment, constitutional 
amendment, and expulsion of elected federal representatives—were self-
 
83  See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1970) (describing our constitutional system, in light of the 
five-case itemization of supermajority voting rules, as one in which “a simple majority vote is 
insufficient on some issues” (emphasis added)). 
84  See supra Part I.A, I.B. Among other things, this fact aligns the argument made here with the 
reasoning of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). There, as Professor Van Alstyne has 
famously observed, the Supreme Court could have easily read Article III’s listing of original-jurisdiction 
cases as establishing only a default rule, such that Congress could add cases to that jurisdiction, just as it 
had (in the Court’s view) in adopting the Judiciary Act of 1789. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical 
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 30–33. The Court, however, deemed the constitutional 
listing not subject to congressional tinkering, relying on the combined effect of the expressio unius 
principle and confirmatory implications it detected in the separate textual passage that treated the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Here, in similar fashion, implications from both the Presentment Clause 
and the Vice President Voting Clause offer strong corroborative reasons to apply the expressio unius 
principle with respect to supermajority voting rules. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 239 
(acknowledging that application of expressio unius principle here is supported by the “Court’s reasoning 
in Marbury”). 
85  This fact renders the reasoning of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), highly pertinent 
here. There, the House refused to seat a recent election winner, Adam Clayton Powell, in part on the 
ground that he had “wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself.” Id. at 492. The 
House based this action on its textual power to “be the Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members.” 
Id. at 521 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Powell argued 
in response that the Qualifications Clause authorized exclusion only if the would-be member did not 
meet the textually enumerated mandates of eligibility, including that he be at least twenty-five years old, 
an American citizen for at least seven years, and a resident of the state from which he was elected. Id. at 
537 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2). Proponents of exclusion responded that the Constitution 
nowhere specified that the age, citizenship, residency, and other specifically enumerated requirements 
(for example, not having been previously convicted on impeachment charges, see U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3, cl. 6) were exclusive, so that the House could “supplement” these “minimum” requisites without the 
need for a constitutional amendment. Powell, 395 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis 
omitted). The Court, however, rejected this claim of “discretionary power” to make “additions” to the 
constitutional listing, reasoning that the specific enumeration of membership requirements was 
“unalterably” fixed. Id. at 534, 537 n.69, 546 n.84 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. 4998 (1967) (statement of 
Rep. Emanuel Celler)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Court based this conclusion on “the 
records of the debates during the Constitutional Convention; available commentary from the post-
Convention, pre-ratification period; and early congressional applications of Art. I, § 5,” as well as “pre-
Convention practices,” id. at 521–—that is, precisely the same forms of historical evidence collected and 
relied on here. The resulting conclusion is straightforward: Just as surely as the Court’s expressio unius 
treatment of listed member qualifications comported with “the basic principles of our democratic 
system” in Powell, id. at 548, those same basic principles dictate that the houses of Congress may depart 
from the rule of majority voting only in those instances where the Constitution itself requires the 
exceptional act of supermajority decisionmaking. 
106:1091  (2012) Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules 
 1109
evidently extraordinary in character.86 The Any-Voting-Number Theory, 
however, would permit either chamber to extend supermajority voting rules 
to the enactment of any legislation, including the most inconsequential 
private bills. Such a result clashes with both common practice and common 
sense.87 No less important, it contradicts the conclusion drawn by the great 
early treatise writer Justice Joseph Story, who found in the constitutional 
text a clear indication that “departure from the general rule, of the right of a 
majority to govern, ought not to be allowed but upon the most urgent 
occasions.”88 
All of these considerations support the conclusion that the 
Constitution’s explicit itemization of five specialized supermajority rules 
carries with it the implication that the houses of Congress may not freely 
add more. And the broader trilogy of textual arguments—based on the 
Presentment Clause, the Vice President Voting Clause, and the expressio 
unius canon—provides an even sturdier textual foundation for concluding 
that bills are “passed” if they receive a majority vote. 
II. SUPERMAJORITY VOTING, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, AND RULES 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
Advocates of the Any-Voting-Number Theory emphasize that sound 
constitutional interpretation requires attentiveness to the document’s overall 
“structure,” so as to interpret it “holistically,” rather than in a spirit of 
 
86  See Remarks of George Clinton to the New York Convention (July 2, 1788), in 22 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2071 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (describing 
the “principle” of the Framers as “in Matters great and Important to have the Concurrence of more than 
a Majority”). See generally Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1014 (noting the obvious “weightiness of the 
issues for which the Constitution provides supermajority requirements”); Benjamin Lieber & Patrick 
Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2376 (1995) (noting the 
Framers’ plan to “avoid” supermajority voting “except in extraordinary circumstances”). 
87  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 437–38) (suggesting that the Framers plainly 
intended that constitutionally specified supermajority rules “were designed to be more demanding than 
the simple majorities for ordinary statutes”). 
88  2 STORY, supra note 45, § 887, at 354 (emphasis added). In the face of these considerations, 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport defend their tightfisted view of the expressio unius principle not by 
relying on evidence from the framing period, but instead by invoking the Constitution’s Legislative 
Journal and State of the Union Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 3. They write: 
The Constitution requires each house to keep a journal, but no one would argue that this provision 
disables each house from directing under its Rules of Proceedings Clause that other kinds of 
records of its proceedings also be printed. The Constitution requires the President to report on the 
“State of the Union,” but no one would argue that he is constitutionally disabled from sending 
messages to Congress on other subjects. 
McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488 (footnotes omitted). This argument is inapposite, because 
not one of the four considerations identified here—concerning itemization of multiple exceptions, the 
presence of confirmatory text, the role of corroborative history, and the Framers’ obvious effort to single 
out special cases for special treatment—applies, even weakly, to hypotheticals built on the 
Constitution’s treatment of legislative journals and State of the Union messages. 
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“linguistic isolation.”89 They are right to advocate this approach.90 But they 
misstep in applying it. We already have seen, for example, why the Any-
Voting-Number Theory raises tensions with Article I’s presentment-and-
override lawmaking system and the Framers’ grant to the Vice President of 
a tiebreaking vote. Other structural difficulties will come into view when 
we turn to the history of the framing. One structural problem, however, is 
so significant that it merits immediate attention. The difficulty is that the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory is at war with itself. 
The inherent tension arises because that theory posits, and even 
depends on, its own structural principle of legislative majoritarianism; 
indeed, it posits two such principles. First, adherents of the Any-Voting-
Number Theory acknowledge that legislative majoritarianism is a “default 
rule” that always controls, absent contrary specification by House or Senate 
Rule.91 This default rule, however, is not set forth in the constitutional text; 
rather, it emanates from nontextual premises that support majority 
decisionmaking. Put another way, Any-Voting-Number Theory proponents 
recognize that structural extrapolation of one important majority-based 
voting rule is entirely uncontroversial. The question presented here is thus 
revealed to be a focused one. It does not concern great battles over 
textualism versus atextualism, nor over disciplined versus free-form 
constitutional interpretation. Rather, the relevant question concerns which 
of the two types of majority voting rules is more sensibly attributed to the 
Framers in the absence of a totally explicit textual treatment: a default rule 
of legislative majoritarianism or a fixed rule of legislative majoritarianism. 
All the arguments offered above and below demonstrate that the fixed rule 
fits best with the Framers’ original plan. 
The second principle of legislative majoritarianism embraced by 
advocates of Any-Voting-Number Theory exposes their approach to even 
greater difficulties. The defense of Rule XXI(5)(c) offered by Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport rests on the underlying premise that the House 
must retain “ultimate power” to repeal that rule, or any supermajority 
voting rule, by way of majority vote.92 In other words, the promulgation of a 
supermajority rule for votes on bills is constitutionally acceptable only 
because it “involves a majority imposing a supermajority requirement upon 
itself until the majority decides to eliminate it.”93 Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport thus endorse both a default-rule norm of legislative 
 
89  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 346–47. 
90  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (looking, in the absence of textual 
determinacy, for interpretive guidance “in the structure of the Constitution”); McGinnis & Rappaport II, 
supra note 6, at 347 n.89 (noting Blackstone’s support of arguments from structure). 
91  McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 488. 
92  Roberts, supra note 11, at 530 n.105; accord id. at 529–31 (endorsing the principle of “ultimate 
majority control” and ascribing the same view to McGinnis and Rappaport). 
93  McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 491. 
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majoritarianism and a fixed non-default-rule norm of legislative 
majoritarianism. In a critical move, however, they define the latter norm as 
one that requires only that the House or Senate not depart from the value of 
legislative majority rule too much. 
But how much is too much? Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, for 
example, state that their ultimate-control principle permits the House to 
pass a three-fifths supermajority voting rule (Rule 1) together with another 
rule under which Rule 1 is itself repealable only by a supermajority vote 
(Rule 2).94 They say that this arrangement works, however, only because “a 
majority could simply pass resolutions that repealed the repeal rule and the 
three-fifths rule” at the same time.95 But what if the House could not act in 
this way? What if, for example, Rule 2 was itself repealable under yet 
another rule (Rule 3) by only a three-fourths vote? And what if another 
House rule (Rule 4) barred near-in-time repeals of Rule 1, Rule 2, and Rule 
3? Professors McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge that “[i]t is not clear 
what limitations, if any, the Constitution imposes on a chamber’s power to 
prevent a majority from obtaining a vote on a measure” that imposes a 
supermajority rule.96 They also acknowledge “that the chambers cannot 
have unlimited discretion to pass rules that regulate the opportunity to hold 
votes, because some versions of such rules function like extreme insulated 
repeal rules.”97 But what versions of what rules fall victim to this limit? Are 
our hypothetical Rules 3 and 4 invalid because they are “extreme insulated 
repeal rules”? And, why, more fundamentally, would we suppose that the 
Framers meant to protect a concededly irreducible norm of legislative 
majoritarianism only in such a circuitous and conceptually knotty way?98 
The proper answer to these questions is suggested by Hamilton’s 
admonition that “a spirit of . . . too great abstraction and refinement” may 
“lead men astray from the plainest paths of reason.”99 If in fact an 
irreducible principle of legislative majoritarianism inheres in the 
Constitution (as promoters of the Any-Voting-Number Theory concede), 
that principle should embody “the most obvious, easy, and natural criterion 
 
94  Id. at 503–07. 
95  Id. at 503–04. 
96  Id. at 507 n.117. 
97  Id. at 508 n.117. 
98  Consider, for example, the question presented if the Senate had passed Rule XXI(5)(c). That rule 
would be repealable (in theory) by majority vote. But debate on changing the rule could itself be stopped 
only by a supermajority vote—indeed, a 67% cloture vote, rather than the usual 60% vote—because the 
matter would concern a rule change, rather than an ordinary bill. See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & 
ADMIN., supra note 20, at 20 (Rule XXII). To be sure, this supermajority cloture rule would be 
repealable (in theory) by majority vote, but some form of the rule in fact now has stood for nearly a 
century. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 194–95. Would this arrangement offend the 
“ultimate power” requirement? Who knows? 
99  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, supra note 9, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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of determination”100—namely, that the vote of a majority is determinative in 
passing all ordinary legislation.101 
Looking at the Constitution through a broader lens confirms this 
conclusion. The Framers’ work centered on constructing an intricate 
balance of powers among the three federal branches and between the nation 
and the states. The crafting of this balance involved the use of a rich array 
of techniques: creating different branches, dividing the legislature into two 
houses, giving each power center different but overlapping authority, 
providing differing modes of selection and different terms of office for 
members of each branch and each congressional chamber, and divvying up 
authority between federal and state officials in complex ways that permitted 
each group to serve as a watchdog of the other.102 Of special importance, 
particularly to James Madison, was the channeling of increased authority to 
the far-reaching national governing unit. This move, Madison predicted, 
would foster the selection of the most qualified legislators and impede the 
too-ready implementation of plans of factional oppression.103 Through all of 
these means, and others as well, the Framers created a complex equilibrium 
of powers, meticulously designed to ensure that no arm of government 
would have too much or too little strength. 
The Framers’ intricate architecture, however, becomes subject to 
radical alteration if the House and the Senate can freely put in place 
supermajority bill-passing voting rules. Supermajority rules adopted by the 
Senate, for example, steal power away from the House by making 
legislative initiatives of the lower chamber far more difficult to transform 
into binding law. In similar fashion, supermajority rules of the House dilute 
the policymaking power of the Senate—an outcome that likewise 
contravenes the Framers’ attempt to establish a system in which “equal 
authority . . . will subsist between the two houses on all legislative 
subjects.”104 Supermajority rules, whether promulgated by the House or the 
Senate, truncate executive authority by constricting the President’s ability 
to pursue new programs and to wield the threat of the veto power in 
 
100  Letter from An Impartial Citizen V to the Petersburg Virginia Gazette (Feb. 28, 1788), in 8 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 428, 432–33 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1988) (specifically endorsing this approach in defense of a rule of recognition “fixed upon a majority of 
voices” in the legislative chamber). 
101  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 87 (noting the oddity of the position of advocates of the Any-
Voting-Number Theory that “majority rule is to be read into [the Rules of Proceedings Clause] despite 
the Constitution’s silence on the subject, whereas it must not be read into [the Presentment Clause] 
because of the Constitution’s silence on the subject”); see also Bloch, supra note 3, at 5 (also 
emphasizing this point); infra notes 190–96 and accompanying text (emphasizing relative simplicity and 
workability of fixed majority-voting-on-bills approach). 
102  See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 7–8 
(Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES]. 
103  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 60–61 (James Madison). 
104  THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 9, at 393 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
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bargaining over changes to legislation. Supermajority rules also can create 
de facto legislative immunities for states, by broadly protecting them from 
preemption of their laws or other meddlesome forms of federal control. The 
bottom line is that permitting promulgation of these rules creates an 
opening for far-reaching alterations of the Constitution’s basic allocation of 
governing powers.105 
Defenders of the Any-Voting-Number Theory have an answer to this 
big-picture critique. They say, in effect, that the authority to self-impose 
supermajority voting rules is itself one component of the Framers’ intricate 
tapestry of blended powers.106 They argue in particular that the Framers 
endorsed the supermajority-vote-checking mechanism by vesting in each 
house of Congress the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”107 
We will soon see why this argument overlooks the Framers’ understandings 
of how legislative majoritarianism fits together with republican self-rule 
and other core values embraced in the constitutional plan.108 There is, 
however, a more immediate problem with this argument: it places on the 
narrow shoulders of the Rules of Proceedings Clause more weight than the 
Clause can carry. Indeed, as we have seen, that theory attributes to this 
once-little-noticed provision—the words of which plainly focus on internal 
matters of procedural self-regulation—a large, if not transformative, role in 
 
105  See Bloch, supra note 3, at 2–4 (emphasizing the “distorting impact adding supermajority 
requirements can have on the other branches”); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 176–77; 
Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 79. In a related vein, self-imposed supermajority voting rules clash with the 
Framers’ design to give “plenary” authority to Congress to pursue the purposes entrusted to it by Article 
I. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 46 (1824). In particular, the Framers chose to vest Congress with 
“ample means” to wield “ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of 
the nation so vitally depends.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 408 (1819). In speaking of federal 
taxes, for example, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “future necessities admit not of calculation or 
limitation,” so that “the power of making provision for them as they arise, ought to be . . . unconfined.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, supra note 9, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton). It is not easy to square an 
“unconfined” taxing authority with the validity of House and Senate rules that systematically do confine 
the enactment of taxing measures by requiring all such measures to secure a supermajority vote. This 
argument, moreover, is not merely an extrapolation distilled from snippets of the historical record. 
Hamilton himself effectively advanced the same proposition at the New York Ratification Convention. 
See Remarks of Alexander Hamilton to the New York Convention (July 2, 1788), in 22 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2072 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (excoriating Antifederalist 
demands for a two-thirds-vote requirement for congressional borrowing because “we ought not do any 
thing to impede a Loan when necessary” and “especially” when “the Gen[era]l defence is concerned”); 
see also 1 STORY, supra note 45, § 330, at 299 (“[T]he majority must have a right to accomplish that 
object by the means, which they deem adequate for the end.”). 
106  See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 244–45. In a related form of structural 
argument, Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky expend much energy seeking to prove that “majoritarianism 
is not a universal principle of American government.” Id. That is true, see, e.g., supra notes 63–67 and 
accompanying text, but beside the point. The question here is not about a “universal principle”; instead, 
it is about the proper meaning to associate with the word “passed” in Article I, Section 7, in light of a 
sweeping range of textual, structural, and historical arguments. 
107  U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2. 
108  See infra Part III. 
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the constitutional allocation of government powers.109 Not one shred of 
evidence from the framing era, however, supports the attribution of such an 
intention to the Framers. To the contrary, the historical record indicates that 
the Clause drew no attention at all in the Philadelphia assembly, at any of 
the ratification conventions, or at any time in between.110 And it simply is 
not easy to believe that the Framers meant the Rules of Proceedings Clause 
to carry with it a power to reframe the overall structure of state and federal 
powers, when not one speaker in any of these settings deemed it 
consequential enough to merit even a passing comment. 
Ascribing to the Rules of Proceedings Clause this critical role is further 
undermined by another consideration: close inspection reveals that the 
provision is best viewed as having no independent significance in 
interpreting the scope of the federal legislative authority. As Joseph Story 
explained in his own terse account of the clause, it has a “propriety” that 
“[n]o person can doubt,” because even “[t]he humblest assembly of men is 
understood to possess [the] power” to make rules for their internal 
operation.111 Without that power, after all, “it would be utterly 
impracticable” for a legislature “to transact . . . business . . . either at all, or 
at least with decency, deliberation, and order.”112 Put another way, it is with 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause as it is, for example, with the President’s 
expressly granted authority to seek opinions from cabinet members.113 
These powers naturally flowed to the relevant government decisionmakers, 
and their existence was merely reaffirmed by the constitutional text.114 
Viewed from this vantage point, the controlling constitutional question 
appears in a clearer light: Did a power to abandon deeply rooted norms of 
 
109  See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
110  See, e.g., Leach, supra note 52, at 1257 n.10 (noting the absence of the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause in early drafts of the Constitution and the delegates’ later agreement to it “without discussion”); 
Roberts, supra note 11, at 532 (noting that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “apparently was not debated 
by the Convention” and “was not addressed in The Federalist” or “a subject of controversy during the 
state ratification debates”). 
111  2 STORY, supra note 45, § 835, at 298. 
112  Id. 
113  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
114  See Roberts, supra note 11, at 531–32 (noting that Rules of Proceedings Clause “apparently was 
not debated” because it appears “[o]n its face” to be a “truism” and “beyond controversy,” that it was 
“probably deemed too obvious to be discussed,” and that “[a]ll legislative bodies . . . formulate and 
adopt rules governing their proceedings as soon as possible after convening”). To be sure, one might 
object to this interpretation on the theory that it renders the Rules of Proceedings Clause mere 
surplusage. The Framers, however, recognized that some clauses of the Constitution were to work in 
exactly the same power-confirmatory way. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 9, at 204–06 
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause “are only 
declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the 
very act of constituting a Fœderal Government”; adding that “the constitutional operation of the 
intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated”; but also 
observing that they were nonetheless included “for greater caution” so as to “leave nothing to 
construction”). 
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majority decisionmaking, to establish all manner of submajority and 
supermajority voting rules, and thus to meddle with the basic structures of 
governance, devolve upon each chamber of Congress not by way of express 
textual grant but by implication from those bodies’ mere existence? Or, to 
build on Justice Story’s thought, did the inherent power of each body to 
promulgate rules to facilitate internal “decency, deliberation, and order” 
carry along with it a de facto capacity to recalibrate the Constitution’s 
otherwise-controlling allocations of power among the House, Senate, 
President, and states? To discover such an implied authority requires an 
inventiveness of impressive proportions.115 
There is another difficulty as well. Even if the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause does have an independent power-conferring significance, the 
Framers’ chosen phrase, “Rules of . . . Proceedings,” on its face suggests a 
contrast with “Rules of Decision”—in much the same way that lawmakers 
often place “procedural law” and “substantive law” into mutually exclusive 
categories.116 Building on this idea, it merits emphasis that the Framers 
never suggested that a proper goal of the Rules of Proceedings Clause was 
to go beyond procedural self-regulation, in a manner that permitted the 
House and Senate to tilt the legislative scales in a significant way for or 
against particular substantive outcomes—to make it hard to pass tax laws, 
to make it easy to pass pay increases, or to make it deeply difficult to alter 
as a general matter any feature of the legal landscape. For these reasons, 
one must strain to find in that Clause even standing alone—that is, even 
ignoring altogether any external, overriding norm of majority voting—a 
font of implied authority to self-impose supermajority voting rules.117 
The Court’s ruling in Cook v. Gralike118 supports this view. That case 
involved the question whether a state could disadvantage candidates for 
federal office who failed to follow state instructions to back term-limit 
reform by prominently flagging that fact on the ballot.119 The state argued 
that it could take this action pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate 
the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”120 The 
Court, however, rejected this argument. In its view, the Elections Clause 
 
115  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 87 (urging that Any-Voting-Number Theory advocates “want to 
take the clause that, naturally enough, confers upon each legislative chamber authority over its own 
parliamentary proceedings and turn it into something more: a power within each chamber fundamentally 
to disrupt the basic structure of national lawmaking”). 
116  See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1941). 
117  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 n.21 (1983) (describing congressional rule-making 
authority as involving only “a closely circumscribed legislative arena”). 
118  531 U.S. 510 (2001). 
119  In particular, Missouri law specified that the legend “DISREGARDED VOTERS’ 
INSTRUCTIONS ON TERM LIMITS” or “DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS” 
be printed on ballots near the names of noncomplying candidates. Id. at 514–15 & 514 n.2 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
120  Id. at 513, 522 (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1). 
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was only “a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not . . . a 
source of power to . . . favor or disfavor a class of candidates.”121 The Court 
also went on to conclude that the “political disadvantage” imposed on term-
limit-opposing office seekers by the unflattering ballot notice caused the 
rule to fall into the substantive, rather than the procedural, camp.122 
This holding stands in obvious tension with rules that mandate 
supermajority support to pass certain categories of bills. On the reasoning 
of Cook, these rules reach well beyond such “procedural” matters as the 
sequencing of balloting, the duration of debating periods, and the form of 
“making and publication” of votes.123 Rather, they impose a “disadvantage” 
on a class of bills, just as surely as the rule in Cook imposed a 
“disadvantage” on “a class of candidates.”124 Indeed, while “the precise 
damage” the ballot labels caused was “disputed” in Cook,125 the result-
tilting consequence of supermajority voting rules is unmistakably—even 
numerically—clear. Under the logic of Cook, these rules thus do not merely 
“regulat[e] . . . procedural mechanisms.”126 As a result, they may well be 
ultra vires because the Rules of Proceedings Clause, just like the Elections 
Clause as interpreted in Cook, focuses on creating “procedures for internal 
governance.”127 
Proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory might respond to this 
challenge by claiming that supermajority voting rules are simply not a big 
deal. This response again builds on the underlying premise of that theory—
namely, that the House and the Senate always remain free to repeal 
supermajority voting rules by majority vote.128 In particular, so the argument 
goes, supermajority voting rules neither threaten constitutional structures 
nor dictate substantive results because the “ultimate power” of legislative 
majorities to displace them always remains in the hands of each chamber.129 
The lesser problem with this line of reasoning is that it rests on near self-
contradiction. Put simply, it makes little sense for constitutional 
 
121  Id. at 523 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 
(1995)). 
122  Id. at 525–26. 
123  Id. at 523–24 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)). 
124  Id. at 525; see id. at 516 (quoting Gralike v. Cook, 996 F. Supp. 901, 910 (W.D. Mo. 1988), as 
reading the state rule as creating “the threat of being disadvantaged in the election”). 
125  Id. at 525. 
126  Id. at 526; see also McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 497 (describing as “substantive” 
the question of “[h]ow much influence should a legislative minority have over the content of 
legislation”). 
127  Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 253 (statement of Professor Gerhardt) (emphasis added). 
For variations on this line of argument, see Open Letter, supra note 6, at 1542; Bloch, supra note 3, at 2; 
and Lieber & Brown, supra note 86, at 2362 (arguing that Rule XXI(5)(c) “appears calculated to achieve 
a substantive result backed by the current majority”). 
128  See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484. 
129  See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
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decisionmakers to fend off powerful textual, structural, and historical 
arguments so as to sustain such rules on the ground that they have no real-
world significance. After all, if they had no real-world significance, they 
would hardly be worthy of defense. 
The larger problem with the argument is that supermajority voting 
rules are a big deal. At least as a general matter, lawmakers adopt rules so 
that they will have effects, not so that they will fade into nothingness, and 
this is surely the case with supermajority voting requirements. Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport recognize the practical impact of these rules, 
notwithstanding their posited exposure to “ultimate” majority control.130 
And all doubts fall away when one considers the present-day Senate. Why? 
Because, as one seasoned Senator recently observed, the effect of that 
body’s supermajoritarian filibuster rule—even if technically repealable by 
majority vote—is so profound that it makes it “all but impossible to conduct 
everyday business.”131 In short, because supermajority voting rules can and 
do have broad on-the-ground consequences, any structural defense of them 
based on their supposed lack of importance stands on feet of clay. 
Recognizing the significant effects of supermajority voting rules 
suggests another structural reason for finding them inconsistent with the 
constitutional plan. This is so because, with regard to important legislative 
decisions, the Framers insisted on the use of bicameralism and presentment, 
or parallel safeguards, to ensure high levels of institutional care. If the 
power to make supermajority voting rules stems from the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause, however, such rules may be promulgated with neither 
bicameralism nor presentment nor anything like them because that 
Clause—in keeping with its limited internal-procedure-related purposes—
permits each house to act without the other. Can it be that the Framers 
meant that voting rules of key significance in the lawmaking process are the 
proper subject of adoption not only in the absence of constitutional 
amendment, but by a house of Congress acting entirely on its own? The 
core structural theme of strong checks and balances conjoins with text and 
history to signal that the answer to this question is “no.” 
 
130  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 345–46 (emphasizing that supermajority voting 
rules “cannot be dismissed as merely hortatory” but instead have “real world effects,” that “[t]he 
repealability of a rule does not in general make it ineffective,”; that supermajority rules at least 
“represent a public precommitment by the majority to a policy,” and that this precommitment “makes it 
more politically costly” to repeal the supermajority voting rule than “to simply vote for a tax increase”); 
see also, e.g., King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 190–91; King, Use of Supermajority, supra 
note 6, at 404 (noting “the inherent inertial power of supermajority provisions”); Roberts, supra note 11, 
at 519 (noting that supermajority rules, even if subject to majority-vote change, are not “useless” in part 
because “they represent Congress’s effort to discipline itself”); id. at 530 (reiterating that such rules 
foster “stability”); id. at 538 (noting that Senate’s supermajority Cloture Rule “exerts a strong pull,” 
even if repealable at any time as a theoretical matter). 
131  Tom Harkin, Fixing the Filibuster, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/sen-tom-harkin/fixing-the-filibuster_b_459969.html. 
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III. SUPERMAJORITY VOTING RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
As Parts I and II show, many textual and structural considerations 
show that the Any-Voting-Number Theory does not fare well under a full-
scale originalist analysis. And as it turns out, a close look at the conditions 
and events of 1787 and 1788 strongly confirms the same conclusion. 
Indeed, four separate elements of that history indicate that the Framers 
intended for Congress to engage in lawmaking only by majority vote. Those 
elements are: (1) the uniform acceptance at the time of parliamentary 
practice under which majorities controlled legislative action absent contrary 
constitutional specification, (2) then-dominant philosophical commitments 
to principles of republicanism that insisted on majority-based lawmaking, 
(3) the experience-driven goal of the delegates and ratifiers to abandon 
supermajority voting methods because those very methods had rendered the 
Confederation Congress highly ineffectual, and (4) the crafting of key 
political compromises at the Philadelphia Convention, including the Great 
Compromise, which supermajority voting rules offend. These four 
considerations, especially in combination, offer a compelling case for 
concluding that the Any-Voting-Number Theory lacks sound support. 
A. Background Norms of Parliamentary Practice 
1. Settled Understandings.—Does our Constitution establish simple-
majority voting, to the exclusion of supermajority voting, as the proper 
manner of enacting ordinary laws, absent a contrary constitutional 
command? The issue is neither novel nor new. A unanimous Supreme 
Court addressed this very question in 1892 and came down emphatically on 
the side of mandatory majority decisionmaking. In United States v. 
Ballin,132 the Court wrote: 
[T]he general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is 
present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body. This has 
been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the 
organic act under which the body is assembled have prescribed specific 
limitations. . . . No such limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and 
therefore the general law of such bodies obtains.133 
This pronouncement does not say that the Constitution establishes 
legislative majority voting as only a “default rule” that the legislature (far 
less, one house of the legislature) can alter. It states that majority voting is 
the operative “rule for all time” unless there is an exception set forth in the 
“organic act” under which the legislature is organized—that is, “the Federal 
Constitution.” Put another way, the Court in Ballin declared that a majority 
vote is always decisive in passing laws because, in contrast to provisions 
 
132  144 U.S. 1 (1892). 
133  Id. at 6. 
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such as the Treaty Clause or Senate Impeachment Clause, the provisions of 
the Constitution that deal with the passage of laws do not dictate a rule of 
supermajority approval.134 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport recognize that “at first glance” 
their position contravenes the Court’s pronouncement in Ballin.135 They go 
on, however, to question the significance of that pronouncement, reasoning 
that it embodies only a nonbinding dictum because the question in the case 
focused on quorum requirements rather than supermajority voting rules.136 
Precisely because Ballin concerned the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 
however, it is unlikely that the Court failed to have the nature and limits of 
that Clause in plain view. Indeed, the Court framed the issue before it not in 
terms of quorum rules, but in these telling terms: “[W]hat is necessary to 
constitute the official action of this legislative and representative body”?137 
All of this matters, but lurking in the background is a deeper and more 
important point. Even if the declaration in Ballin had been pure obiter, the 
Court said what it said because, for the Justices, it was obvious and 
uncontroversial. Put simply, the Court concluded without difficulty that 
Congress had to engage in lawmaking by way of majority-based voting.138 
With this thought in view, it is worth asking a simple question: If the 
background understanding of a unanimous Supreme Court in 1892 was that 
bills have “passed” so long as they have received a majority vote, why 
should we suppose that that was not the background understanding of the 
Framers in 1787 and 1788? Professors McGinnis and Rappaport point to no 
intervening legal developments that could have led the Court to take a 
radically different view of how legislatures operate than was taken by the 
Framers themselves. These skilled analysts point to no previously 
unavailable evidence drawn from the Convention or ratification debates that 
 
134  A near-century later, the Court reiterated that “the Constitution’s prescription for legislative 
action” is “passage by a majority of both Houses,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983), and 
alluded without equivocation to “the simple majority required for passage of legislation.” Id. at 956 
n.21. 
135  McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 492–93. Even so, they go on to float the idea that “the 
better interpretation” of the statement in Ballin is that the Court meant to set forth only a “default rule” 
that permits self-imposition of supermajority voting rules. Id. at 493. The language of Ballin is there for 
all to see and a default-rule translation is (to say the least) not easy to reconcile with the Court’s 
declaration that “the rule” of majority voting applies “except” when there are “prescribed specific 
limitations” on majority voting “in the Federal Constitution” itself. Id. at 492–93 (quoting Ballin, 144 
U.S. at 6). 
136  Id. at 493 (asserting that the question of self-imposed supermajority voting rules was “neither 
discussed in the opinion nor raised by the facts of the case”). 
137  Ballin, 144 U.S. at 7. 
138  The Court in Ballin did not stand alone in this regard. Indeed, one then-leading treatise writer on 
American constitutional law had previously expressed exactly the same view. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF 
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 141 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868) (“A simple majority of a 
quorum is sufficient, unless the [C]onstitution establishes some other rule . . . .”). 
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contradicts the view of legislative operations endorsed by nine Justices in 
Ballin. 
In fact, the historical record confirms the Ballin Court’s conclusion in 
the strongest way. At the time of the framing, the English Parliament had 
always and only acted through majority voting.139 State legislative practice 
was likewise universally rooted in the norm of majoritarian 
decisionmaking.140 The Philadelphia Convention and each of the thirteen 
state ratification conventions themselves acted according to the principle of 
majority, not supermajority, rule.141 The early House and Senate passed all 
 
139  See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 77 (“Majority rule was . . . the established practice of the 
British Parliament . . . .”); McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 341 (“[M]ajority rule did govern 
the British Parliament . . . .”). See generally Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 766 (1996) 
(“[E]vents of the English constitutional experience . . . were familiar to [the Framers] and inform our 
understanding of the purpose and meaning of constitutional provisions.”); McGinnis & Rappaport II, 
supra note 6, at 348 (emphasizing, albeit in another context, that “[h]istory . . . helps resolve ambiguities 
because the Constitution established its system of political governance against the backdrop of the 
English Constitution—itself a distillation of established practices”). 
140  See King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 178 (“[T]here has yet to be offered an 
example of where a rule analogous to . . . House Rule [XXI(5)(c)]—a rule in which a legislative body 
adopts for itself a supermajority requirement on certain substantive legislation—has ever been used 
by . . . any of the original thirteen Colonial legislatures or in any established parliamentary body 
preceding the adoption of the Constitution.”); see also AMAR, supra note 45 (“[N]either Parliament nor 
any state circa 1787 generally required more than simple house majority votes for the passage of bills or 
the adoption of internal house procedures, even though in many of these states no explicit clause 
explicitly specified this voting rule. In America circa 1787, majority rule in these contexts thus truly did 
go without saying.”). This idea was captured during the ratification period itself. See Letter from An 
Independent Freeholder to the Winchester Virginia Gazette (Jan. 25, 1788), in 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY supra note 62, at 325, 325–26 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) (“I can 
conceive no reason why the ordinary business of legislation should not be determined in Congress by a 
majority of voices as is done in all our assemblies, and other public bodies.” (emphasis added)). 
Consistent with this history, it was also the case that “simple majority vote by colony was used to decide 
matters” during the 1770s in the Continental Congress. CALVIN JILLSON & RICK K. WILSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL DYNAMICS: STRUCTURE, COORDINATION AND CHOICE IN THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 53 (1994). 
141  With respect to the state ratifying conventions, each one operated according to “simple majority 
rule.” See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, 
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 750 (1994); id. at 764 (noting 
that Madison observed in THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 that states would act in this manner); see also AMAR, 
supra note 45 (manuscript at 70) (adding that state conventions acted in this manner even though “the 
federal Constitution’s text contained not a single word specifying majority rule as the proper metric,” 
and that majority rule in this context “[e]vidently . . . went without saying”). Indeed, state ratification 
conventions adopted simple majority rule even in settings where “pre-existing state constitutions could 
plausibly have been construed to require something more than a simple majority vote.” Id. Even against 
this backdrop, however, no hue and cry—or even a whisper of objection—over majority-based voting 
was raised. Rather, as Professor Amar has documented, leading opponents of the Constitution repeatedly 
emphasized the need, under established principles, for the minority to accede to the vote of the majority 
of the body. Id. at 72. For example, Patrick Henry, who bitterly opposed the proposed Constitution, 
bluntly observed at the hard-fought Virginia Ratification Convention that “[i]f this be the opinion of the 
majority, I must submit.” Remarks of Patrick Henry to the Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 943, 956 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
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laws by way of majority vote,142 and in fact they unwaveringly adhered to 
that practice until Rule XXI(5)(c) took hold in 1975.143 The records of the 
Philadelphia Convention and the follow-up ratification process contain not 
one statement by one person that even hints that the houses of Congress 
could impose on themselves supermajority voting rules.144 On the other 
hand, those records contain many statements that presuppose or endorse 
majority voting on bills.145 James Madison captured the mood at the 
 
1990). All of this underscores the deep-seated commitment at the time to majority voting by 
parliamentary bodies, at least absent a contrary signal in an extraordinary form of background law. 
142  See Roberts, supra note 11, at 525. 
143  See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting the statement of the clerk of the 
House of Representatives that “[t]he House has never failed to deem passed a bill that has received the 
support of a simple majority”); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 178 (asserting that the 
supermajority-to-pass-a-bill approach had “never been part of either the House or the Senate” until 
adoption of Rule XXI(5)(c)). See generally supra note 10 (collecting additional authorities). This 
consistent practice of not acting pursuant to a supposed congressional power—especially for many years 
immediately following the nation’s founding—tellingly illuminates the original meaning of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (interpreting the Constitution in 
light of the enactments of the earliest Congresses). This same view of the Constitution’s meaning also 
comports with the persistent centrality of majority voting throughout the politics of our nation, which 
has been noted by both the Supreme Court and others. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE 
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 296–97, 369 (2010) (noting early opposition to 
nonmajority voting requirements, and detailing a number of votes leading up to New York’s ratification 
of the Constitution, all of which were decided by majority vote). The centrality of majoritarianism has, 
both wisely and unsurprisingly, continued to be a key theme throughout American history. See, e.g., 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (“[T]he democratic ideals of equality and majority 
rule . . . have served this Nation so well in the past . . . .”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980) (describing majority rule as “the core of the 
American governmental system”). 
144  See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, 
POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 33 (1997) (“The records of the 
convention and the arguments in the Federalist Papers give no indication that the framers either 
anticipated or desired procedural protection for Senate minorities.”). This point is of particular 
significance because the Supreme Court has declared that such omissions are helpful in ferreting out 
original meaning. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812 (1995) (“We . . . find 
compelling the complete absence in the ratification debates of any assertion that States had the power to 
add qualifications [for federal representatives].”). 
145  See, e.g., Letter from An Impartial Citizen to the Petersburg Virginia Gazette (Jan. 10, 1788), in 
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 293, 295 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1988) (“The Executive has . . . no absolute negative on the laws, but a power of preventing the passing a 
law by a bare majority . . . .” (emphasis added)); Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Oct. 
10, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 30, 30–31 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1983) (“[T]he house of representatives, the democrative branch, as it is called, is to 
consist of 65 members . . . . Thirty-three representatives will make a quorum for doing business, and a 
majority of those present determine the sense of the house.”); Remarks of James Wilson to the 
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 487, 493 
(listing as one reason for adopting the Constitution that “[e]verything almost is transacted by a majority. 
The minority do not govern.”); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention 
of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 62, at 13, 26 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (“The house of 
representatives is to consist of 65 members . . . . Thirty-three members will form a quorum for doing 
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Virginia Ratification Convention when he lit into late-blooming 
Antifederalist proposals to tack additional supermajority voting rules onto 
the Constitution. As he declared: 
This policy of guarding against political inconveniences, by enabling a small 
part of the community to oppose the Government, and subjecting the majority 
to a small minority is fallacious. In some cases it may be good; in others it may 
be fatal. In all cases it puts it in the power of the minority to decide a question 
which concerns the majority.146 
Statements to the same effect came from such luminaries as Alexander 
Hamilton147 and James Wilson,148 “one of the Constitution’s two most 
important Framers, and the leading lawyer in America.”149 Perhaps the most 
telling observation came from the wise and worldly Benjamin Franklin, 
who reminded his fellow delegates that supermajority voting rules were 
“contrary to the common practice of Assemblies in all Countries and 
Ages.”150 
To be sure, as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport emphasize, the 
Articles of Confederation required supermajority votes for the pre-
Constitution Congress to act in important areas.151 But, consistent with the 
 
business; and 17 of these, being the majority, determine the sense of the house. . . . [In the Senate] 
fourteen senators make a quorum; the majority of whom, eight, determines the sense of that body: 
except in judging on impeachments, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, when two thirds of 
the senators present, must concur.”); see also Letter from Antoine de la Forest, French Vice Consul for 
the United States, to Comte de Montmorin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Marine 
(Sept. 28, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 259, 260 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (noting, in describing the House of Representatives, that “in it a majority 
of individuals, and no longer that of States, will decide all questions”); see generally infra notes 156, 
199–217, 230–31, 248–61 and accompanying text (collecting various additional statements). 
146  Remarks of James Madison to the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 62, at 1473, 1503 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993). As 
Madison’s statement highlights, untempered endorsement of majoritarian lawmaking surfaced not only 
at the Philadelphia Convention, but in the ratification proceedings as well. For example, in both Virginia 
and New York, focused proposals to require supermajority votes on such matters as regulating 
commerce and borrowing money were pushed forward. In response, key Federalists—in particular, 
Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay—decried these initiatives as unjust and action-stifling tools of 
minority control. See MAIER, supra note 143, at 297, 367–69. 
147  See infra notes 216–17, 251–61 and accompanying text. 
148  See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
149  Amar, supra note 141, at 765. 
150  1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 198 (statement of Benjamin Franklin). Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport have noted that “[w]hen the Framers drafted the Constitution, they did so against a traditional 
understanding of the limits of legislative power.” McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 505. That is 
right. And so it follows that the Framers did not envision—precisely because of this “traditional 
understanding”—that the legislative power could not be made subject to a scattershot array, far less the 
uniform application, of self-imposed submajority and supermajority voting rules. 
151  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 341 n.65 (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6, which required a 9-of-13 vote to take such actions as engaging in war, entering 
into treaties, and coining, borrowing, or appropriating money). 
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principle of Ballin, the Articles constituted the “organic law” under which 
that Congress was organized. And no evidence suggests that the 
Confederation Congress could have or would have sought to impose 
supermajority voting rules on itself in areas other than those specified in the 
Articles themselves.152 In any event, the essential objective of the framing 
was to get rid of the Articles—and to do so in large part (as we soon shall 
see) precisely because the supermajority voting constraints they imposed 
created far-reaching problems. Put simply, at least when it comes to an 
endorsement of supermajority voting rules, there is no basis for reasoning 
by analogy from legislative practice under the Articles to how the Framers 
meant their radically new Constitution to operate. 
Pronouncements of leading thinkers of the time confirm that the 
Framers intended that the chambers of Congress would have to act on bills 
by majority vote. In his Second Treatise on Government, for example, John 
Locke asserted—in words directly foreshadowing Ballin—that “in 
assemblies impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by 
that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for 
the act of the whole, and, of course, determines, as having by the law of 
nature and reason the power of the whole.”153 The same view was voiced by 
Thomas Jefferson, “the great parliamentarian of the early Republic.”154 
Tracking Locke, Jefferson invoked “natural law,” “common law,” and 
“common right”155 to posit that:  
The first principle of republicanism is, that the lex-majoris partis is the 
fundamental law of every society of individuals of equal rights; to consider the 
 
152  Indeed, the Articles expressly indicated that, absent specification of a supermajority rule, action 
would be determined by “the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled.” ARTICLES 
OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport seek to turn this 
language to their advantage by saying the omission of similar language from the Constitution signaled a 
design to permit self-imposed supermajority and submajority bill-voting rules. McGinnis & Rappaport 
II, supra note 6, at 342 n.67, 347. This argument lacks force, however, because it seeks to draw a 
parallel where no basis for doing so exists. Why did the Framers fail to include what could have been 
only roughly comparable language in the Constitution? Perhaps because, unlike the Articles, the 
Constitution included no single clause establishing different voting requirements for different categories 
of legislation. Perhaps because the relevant provision of the treaty-like Articles dealt with majority 
voting on a state-by-state basis, which had no relevance at all to the new Constitution. Perhaps because 
the Articles established a majority-of-all-the-states rule, which the Constitution effectively abandoned in 
its separate Quorum Clause. See supra note 45. Whatever the precise reason, the controlling point is that 
nothing in the historical record indicates that a failure to mention majority voting expressly in the 
Constitution reflected a plan to shift away from majority rule. To the contrary, that record shows beyond 
peradventure that the Framers viewed the Articles as having made too little provision for legislative 
majoritarianism, rather than too much. See infra notes 233–62 and accompanying text. 
153  JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 96, at 55 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690). 
154  Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of 
Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 209–10 (2008). 
155  Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 23, 171 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
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will of the society enounced by the majority of a single vote, as sacred as if 
unanimous, is the first of all lessons in importance . . . .156 
William Blackstone, the period’s most influential Anglo-American legal 
thinker, put the point even more bluntly, declaring that, under the British 
system, “[i]n each house the act of the majority binds the whole.”157 This 
same understanding surfaced again in the Commentaries of Joseph Story, 
who observed that the Constitution’s two-thirds-vote rule for impeachment 
convictions “deserted” the general principle of “all legislative bodies,” 
under which a “mere majority make the decision.”158 In sum, during the 
 
156  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F.H. Alexander Von Humboldt (June 13, 1817), in 10 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 88, 89 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 
1899). Jefferson’s writings abound with such proclamations. See generally Thomas Jefferson, Notes on 
the State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 155, at 171 (citing majority rule 
as “the natural law of every assembly of men, whose numbers are not fixed by any other law”); Thomas 
Jefferson, Observations on the Article États-Unis Prepared for the Encyclopedie, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 158, 173 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894) 
(“[America is] a country where the will of the majority is the law . . . .”); Thomas Jefferson, The Anas, 
in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 154, 215 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1892) (“[T]he will of the majority honestly expressed should give law.”); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 86, 90 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895) (“[T]he fundamental law of every society[] 
[is] the lex majoris partis, to which we are bound to submit.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the 
Democratic Citizens of the County of Adams, Pennsylvania (Mar. 20, 1808), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 262, 262 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor & Maury 1853) (“[A] 
nation ceases to be republican only when the will of the majority ceases to be the law.”); Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to the Deputies of the Cherokee Upper Towns (Jan. 9, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 228, 229 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Derby & Jackson 1859) (“Our way 
is . . . to consider that as law for which the majority votes.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George 
Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 101, 103 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895) (“[T]he measures of the fair majority . . . ought always to be 
respected.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 4 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 473, 479 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894) (“[I]t is 
my principle that the will of the majority should always prevail.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John 
Breckenridge (Jan. 29, 1800), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 416, 417 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1896) (stating that the lex majoris partis is a “fundamental law of 
nature, by which alone self government can be exercised by a society”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to William Carmichael (June 3, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22, 25 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1895) (endorsing “the principle that the majority 
must give the law”); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp (“[A]bsolute acquiescence in the decisions of the 
majority[] [is] the vital principle of republics . . . .”); The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, PRINCETON 
UNIV., http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/index.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
157  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181. 
158  2 STORY, supra note 45, § 776, at 247 (adding that the two-thirds-vote impeachment-conviction 
rule might have been challenged on this ground); see id. § 887, at 354 (noting that the veto override 
power is based in part on the principle that “all laws . . . passed might, at any time, be repealed at the 
mere will of the majority”); id. § 1091, at 539 (opining that the rejection of supermajority voting rules 
for navigation acts stemmed in part from “the general impropriety of allowing the minority in a 
government to control, and in effect to govern all the legislative powers of the majority”). 
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period of the framing, there existed a firm understanding that, when 
parliamentary bodies legislate, they do so by majority vote. 
In the face of these pronouncements, Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport direct attention to a general treatment of parliamentary process 
written by Luther Stearns Cushing in 1856. In one passage in his treatise, 
Cushing wrote: 
[T]he law of the majority is universally admitted in all legislative assemblies; 
unless, in reference to particular cases, persons or circumstances, a different 
rule is prescribed, by some paramount authority, or is agreed upon beforehand 
and established by the assembly itself, by which a smaller number is permitted, 
or a larger number is required, to do some particular act. But even in these 
cases, it is the will of the majority that governs; because it is by a major vote, 
in the first instance, that the rule itself is established . . . .159 
Based on this text, McGinnis and Rappaport claim that “it was 
understood in the nineteenth century that legislatures could enact 
supermajority rules” applicable to the enactment of bills.160 These sentences, 
however, do not speak directly to the passage of bills (particularly bills in 
the Federal Congress), as opposed to, for example, the management of 
internal proceedings pursuant to mechanisms such as agenda-setting and 
debate-cloture rules.161 What is more, in a nearby passage that all but tracks 
the “passed” language of Article I, Cushing declared without qualification 
that “whatever is regularly agreed upon by a majority of the members of a 
 
159  CUSHING, supra note 59, para. 414, at 168 (footnote omitted). 
160  McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 493. 
161  See, e.g., Open Letter, supra note 6, at 1541 (recognizing the potential propriety under the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause of a supermajority voting rule to suspend the rules in exceptional circumstances 
because such a rule does not involve substantive decisionmaking but instead the sequencing of 
business). The point is that the Cushing statement on its face is uncontroversial, because some tasks—
such as committee reviews and interchamber negotiations—are unquestionably assignable to groups 
other than legislative majorities. However, as this article makes clear—and as the unanimous Court 
recognized in Ballin—the enactment of bills other than by majority vote falls into a different category. It 
is noteworthy in this regard that the quotation from the Cushing treatise endorses action, in certain 
contexts, not only by a “larger number” than a majority but also and equally action by a “smaller 
number.” As explained elsewhere, however, the possibility of passing laws by submajority vote has been 
rejected both in Ballin and by the modern Court. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. In 
addition, Cushing endorses at most nonmajority voting rules only “in reference to particular cases, 
persons or circumstances.” See text accompanying supra note 159 (quoting this language) (emphasis 
added). The Any-Voting-Number Theory itself, however, goes much further and thus violates even the 
most generous reading of Cushing because it countenances supermajority voting rules that apply to all 
bills in an across-the-board fashion. Also of particular significance is the strong indication given by 
Cushing elsewhere in his treatise that any power to formulate bill-related supermajority voting rules 
would have no application to the Federal Congress. This inference stems from his unqualified 
observation that “[i]n the constitution of the United States . . . it is provided, that the [Vice President, in 
his capacity as presiding officer of the Senate] shall give the casting vote, when the body over which he 
presides is equally divided.” CUSHING, supra note 59, para. 298, at 115 (emphasis added). See generally 
supra Part I.B (discussing the inherent incompatibility of supermajority voting rules with the grant to the 
Vice President of the casting vote power). 
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legislative assembly is a thing ‘done and past’ by that body.”162 This 
statement, it bears emphasis, is particularly suggestive of the meaning of the 
Presentment Clause because sources from the time demonstrate 
conclusively that the terms “passed” and “past” were interchangeable under 
then-prevailing usage.163 Considered as a whole, then, the passages from 
Cushing may well cut more against, than for, the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory. But even if that reading of the textual tea leaves is inadmissible, 
Luther Cushing, though a fine parliamentarian, was not Thomas Jefferson 
or a member of his generation.164 And it is the intensely majority-rule-
centered ideas of Jefferson—together with those of Locke, Blackstone, 
Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, Franklin, and their contemporaries—that 
dominated the framing of the American Constitution.165 
The mandatory norm of legislative majoritarianism that these Framers 
embraced took hold in large measure because it made good sense. We will 
soon see (in sections B, C and D) why it made sense in light of then-
dominant philosophical outlooks and political realities. The point here (that 
is, in the remainder of section A) is something else—namely, that the norm 
dovetailed with background legal doctrines of which the Framers were well 
aware. The most salient of those doctrines were the settled prohibition on 
entrenching legislative programs and the canon of interpretation that 
eschews absurd results. 
2. The Anti-Entrenchment Rule.—Empowering the chambers of 
Congress to install supermajority voting rules for enacting laws would raise 
pressing tensions with the long-recognized ban on legislative entrenchment. 
At the core of Britain’s unwritten Constitution, solidly in place at the time 
of the framing, stood one idea: “Acts of parliament derogatory from the 
power of subsequent parliaments bind not.”166 This rule against legislative 
entrenchment was carried over from the mother country into American 
 
162  CUSHING, supra note 59, para. 412, at 167 (emphasis added). 
163  2 WEBSTER, supra note 35, at 31. Of no less importance, this treatment of the word “past” in 
British law was commonplace in the preconstitutional period. See, e.g., LAWS AND ACTS PAST IN THE 
FOURTH AND LAST SESSION OF THE SECOND PARLIAMENT OF OUR MOST HIGH AND DREAD SOVERAIGN 
CHARLES THE SECOND 1673–74 (Edinburgh, His Majest ie’s Printers 1674) (emphasis added). Nor 
should this parallelism be surprising because “[p]ast originated simply as a variant spelling of passed, 
the past participle of pass.” JOHN AYTO, WORD ORIGINS: THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF ENGLISH WORDS 
FROM A TO Z 369 (2d ed. 2005).  
164  Not surprisingly, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport themselves emphasize the parliamentary 
writings of Thomas Jefferson, albeit in other contexts. See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 
332 n.26 (citing these materials regarding the “right and duty” of members to vote); id. at 333 n.28 
(same). 
165  See King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 178 n.212 (dismissing Cushing’s statement 
as “to say the least, less than compelling”). 
166  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90; see also Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1029 
(relying on Bacon, Coke, Petyt, Blackstone, and Dicey in asserting that “canonical sources on English 
law certainly support a constitutional principle against legislative entrenchment”). 
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law,167 and the Supreme Court has endorsed it time and again.168 For 
instance, the Court has recognized that “no one legislature can, by its own 
act, disarm their successors of any . . . powers.”169 The Court has also 
declared: “The latter [legislatures] have the same power of repeal and 
modification which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less. All 
occupy, in this respect, a footing of perfect equality.”170 
Supermajority voting rules raise difficulties under this principle 
because any such rule makes it harder for Congress to act, in whatever field 
the rule touches, than was the case before the rule came to be.171 Consider, 
for example, a new rule that provides that the Senate cannot pass civil rights 
laws except by a two-thirds vote. This rule would lock in federal civil rights 
law as it stood on the date of the rule’s adoption because that law could no 
longer be modified except by way of supermajority, rather than simple 
majority, action. The resulting discordance between supermajority voting 
rules and the anti-entrenchment principle could not be more apparent.172 
Defenders of the Any-Voting-Rule Theory object to this analysis by 
recurring to a now-familiar centerpiece of their thinking. They say that 
supermajority voting rules do not unduly entrench preexisting law because 
the houses of Congress retain the “ultimate power” to repeal those rules 
(including, for example, our hypothetical two-thirds-vote civil rights rule) 
by majority vote.173 As we already have seen, however, this argument runs 
 
167  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 45 (manuscript at 449, 476 n.56) (noting that there is “[c]lear 
evidence that the founding generation accepted” the antientrenchment principle); Chafetz, supra note 18, 
at 1033 (concluding that “American history, like the British, . . . evinces a strongly anti-entrenchment 
view”); John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 204 (2003); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative 
Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 404–05; Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 247. 
168  See, e.g., Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular 
Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years.”); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 621 (1898) (noting the “general policy” that “each subsequent legislature 
has equal power to legislate”). 
169  Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 431 (1853). 
170  Newton v. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879). 
171  See Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1034. 
172  To be sure, some commentators have challenged the validity of the antientrenchment doctrine 
altogether. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002). But the Court has embraced the principle over many years while never signaling 
reservations about its deep historical roots or its centrality to American law. See supra notes 168–70 and 
accompanying text. 
173  See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. The McGinnis-Rappaport position on the power 
of majorities to alter rules by majority vote is not universally shared. In particular, Virginia Seitz and 
Joseph Guerra argue that there is no constitutional bar on requiring supermajority votes to change rules 
even if there is such a bar with respect to changing laws. See Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A 
Constitutional Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 3 (2004). 
From this vantage point, the Any-Voting-Number Theory must fail because no plausible view of the 
antientrenchment principle can tolerate supermajority requirements both for rules and for laws. 
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up against hard reality because supermajority rules, once promulgated, do 
have continuing effects regardless of the doctrines that govern their 
repealability.174 Those effects, moreover, are magnified in the Senate 
because it has always been viewed as a “continuing body,” with the 
consequence that its rules remain operative, often for decades, until 
affirmatively singled out for alteration.175 For these reasons, our 
hypothesized civil-rights-law supermajority voting rule makes it harder to 
adopt civil rights laws than was the case before—a result that defeats the 
“perfect equality” of legislatures over time that the prohibition on 
entrenchment purports to vindicate.176 
The Framers knew the anti-entrenchment doctrine well.177 It was a 
central—perhaps the central—doctrine of then-extant British constitutional 
law.178 There is no reason to believe that the Framers lost track of that 
doctrine as they shaped the charter of 1787. As a result, good reason exists 
to believe they meant to endorse the mode of passing laws most attuned to 
that doctrine’s purposes and commands. That mode reflects an 
uncomplicated idea—namely, that all legislatures at all times will enact all 
laws by simple majority vote. 
3. Absurd Results.—There is another reason rooted in background 
law for concluding that the Framers embraced an unabridgeable mandate of 
legislative majoritarianism. The reason is that a rejection of that mandate is 
in tension with the canon of construction that abjures “absurd results.”179 
Professor Rubenfeld’s argument against the Any-Voting-Number Theory 
centered on this point.180 He suggested, for example, that the theory would 
authorize a “Big Three Rule,” under which votes cast by House members 
from California, New York, and Texas would not count in determining the 
fate of a bill.181 In reaching this conclusion, Professor Rubenfeld reasoned 
that the Big Three Rule should be no more constitutionally problematic than 
Rule XXI(5)(c), if in fact the Rules of Proceedings Clause permits the 
House to fiddle with voting rules in wide-open fashion. Professors 
 
174  See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
175  See Aaron–Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 1401, 1406 (2010). 
176  Newton v. Commr’s, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879). 
177  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 345. 
178  See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
179  E.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); see also 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91 (agreeing that the law eschews “absurd consequences, manifestly 
contradictory to common reason”). 
180  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 79–80. Professor Chafetz has also advanced an absurd-results 
argument, claiming that if the word “passed” permits either house of Congress to impose supermajority 
voting requirements, then the word “elected” in the Seventeenth Amendment should logically permit 
that house to install a supermajority election requirement to displace incumbent House Members or 
Senators. Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1013. 
181  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 79–80. 
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McGinnis and Rappaport responded by claiming that neither the Big Three 
Rule nor any of several other nightmarish voting methods Professor 
Rubenfeld had concocted would pass constitutional muster under the theory 
they espoused. As for the Big Three Rule, it could not stand because it 
would violate the House Composition Clause, which states that “[t]he 
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States,”182 thus implying that each 
House member must receive one equally weighted vote.183 According to 
Professor Rubenfeld, however, the making of this argument hoisted 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport on their own petard. The problem, he 
asserted, was that deriving an unabridgeable one-equally-weighted-vote rule 
from the sparse language of the House Composition Clause (which on its 
face speaks only to membership in the House, rather than to voting rules) 
entailed an even more adventurous non-text-based interpolation than 
deriving a fixed principle of majority voting from the word “passed” in 
Article I, Section 7.184 
One need not work through each of Professor Rubenfeld’s feared 
applications of the McGinnis-Rappaport approach—and each of his 
adversaries’ intricate rejoinders—to come away with nervousness about the 
approach itself. The very existence of such vexing quandaries throws the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory into a negative light, at least if one values the 
avoidance of needless complexity in basic rules of law. And the problem is 
worse—indeed, much worse—than that. For whatever one concludes about 
the Big Three Rule, the constitutional principle advanced by Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport invites the installation of a bizarre assortment of 
congressional voting methodologies. 
One set of problems concerns the interaction of different clauses in the 
Constitution. We have already seen that the Any-Voting-Number Theory 
produces one serious anomaly—namely, that Congress can subject itself to 
a higher bar to pass a law than to override a presidential veto.185 The Treaty 
Clause raises a related problem. Because of the extraordinary characteristics 
of treaties, Article II requires the Senate to approve them by a two-thirds 
vote. Of particular importance for our purposes, the Treaty Clause on its 
face forecloses the imposition of any stricter ratification benchmark by 
expressly stating that treaties come into effect “provided two thirds of the 
 
182  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
183  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 333 n.28. 
184  See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 83. There is more to be said about the reliance Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport place on the House and Senate Composition Clauses. Of particular 
importance, as we have seen, they find latent in these Clauses a strong principle that each House 
member (and presumably each Senator) must have an equally weighted vote. Recognizing this norm of 
equality, however, puts supermajority rules in danger because such rules afford bill opponents and bill 
proponents, very different—and thus unequal—levels of decisionmaking power. See infra notes 287–90 
and accompanying text. 
185  See supra Part I.A. 
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Senators present concur.”186 The topsy-turvy result is hard to miss. It arises 
because the Framers signaled the need for a much-heightened level of 
legislative consensus in the distinctly important treaty-ratification context, 
as opposed to the routine-legislation context. Under the Any-Voting-
Number Theory, however, the Senate is free to push past a two-thirds 
voting requirement to enact even the most mundane of bills, while not being 
free to push past that threshold to approve the most consequential of 
treaties. Indeed, the theory permits promulgation of rules under which 
mundane laws must be passed by 75%, 80%, or even greater majorities in 
both the House and Senate, while treaties automatically become federal law 
upon a 67% vote of the Senate alone. Few will question that an 
endorsement of this far-more-caution-for-mundane-laws-than-for-treaties 
outcome would be troublingly strange.187 
Another set of difficulties is raised by submajority voting rules, which 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport do not hesitate to defend.188 Might it 
 
186  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
187  Another form of intertextual problem is raised by the Constitution’s treatment of senatorial 
consent to presidential nominations. See id. The governing clause requires, without more, 
“the . . . Consent of the Senate” for the appointment of “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” Id. Apparently, under 
the Any-Voting-Number Theory, the Senate could specify by rule that its “consent” is given only if it 
votes by more than 70% or 80% to approve a presidential appointment. In other words, the Senate could 
impose on itself a numerical test for approving appointments that is more exacting than the unalterable 
two-thirds approval requirement for treaties, even though the Framers went out of their way to make it 
more difficult to approve treaties than to approve presidential appointments.  
A kindred problem is posed by the Constitution’s Expulsion Clause, id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, which on its 
face installed a much more exacting voting rule for expelling members based on wrongdoing than was 
applicable to excluding them under the Qualifications Clause, id. art. I. § 5, cl. 1, due to technical 
ineligibility. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969). The Constitution’s terms, however, 
do not explicitly preclude either House from raising the requisite vote for exclusion to two-thirds or 
three-quarters or even 90%. The self-imposition of any such rule, however, would contravene the 
Framers’ plain plan to differentiate between these two distinct vehicles for restricting legislative 
membership. Notably, in defending what became the Expulsion Clause, Madison argued that “the right 
of expulsion . . . was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum.” 2 FARRAND, supra 
note 50, at 254. As a result, “[h]e moved that ‘with the concurrence of 2/3’ might be inserted between 
may & expel.” Id. Gouverneur Morris responded that “[t]his power may be safely trusted to a majority.” 
Id. The underlying supposition of both men seems clear: This choice between the vote of a “majority of 
a quorum” or “the concurrence of 2/3” was binary. There was no suggestion that one chamber might 
adopt its own rule, under which it would be harder to exclude members for failing to meet technical 
qualification requirements than to expel them for serious wrongdoing. 
188  See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 490 n.38. Many of us will sense that the Any-
Voting-Number Theory’s support of submajority voting rules faces such serious trouble under core 
democratic principles that those rules cannot possibly stand. Of no small importance, the Supreme Court 
has indicated its agreement with this conclusion not only in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(1891), but also in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983). See text accompanying supra note 133. 
And submajority voting rules clash as well with early pronouncements of key authorities. See, e.g., 2 
STORY, supra note 45, § 699, at 180–81 (noting, in light of the Constitution’s structuring of the House 
and the Senate, that “[n]o law or resolution can be passed without the concurrence, first of a majority of 
the people, and then of a majority of the states”). Supermajority-voting-rule defenders might seek to 
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really be, for example, that a bill can become law based on the affirmative 
votes of only one Senator and only one House member followed by 
presidential approval? So long as that result is supported by House and 
Senate rules, this exotic style of lawmaking would be permissible under the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory.189 What if the Senate specified by rule that 
any measure adopted by majority vote in the House is deemed passed so 
long as fifteen (or ten or five) Senators vote for it? Such a result would in 
effect rule-make the Senate out of existence—or at least compromise in the 
most extreme way that body’s intended checking function. 
These difficulties take on an even sharper focus when one recalls that 
the Any-Voting-Number Theory invites creation of any mix of nonmajority 
voting rules for any mix of legislative subjects. Different bill-passing 
rules—of either the supermajority or submajority genre—might be 
established for laws that deal with tax increases, benefit cuts, agriculture, 
railroads, banking, and on and on.190 Proliferating definitional ambiguities 
would wait in the wings, together with government-delegitimizing protests 
about unequal access to the federal lawmaking process.191 
 
sidestep these problems by stipulating that the Constitution does impose an unmodifiable requirement of 
at least a majority vote to pass a law. This response, however, proves too much because the essential 
problem with supermajority rules (particularly on the view of the Framers themselves) is that they 
channel controlling voting power to a minority of legislative dissenters. See infra notes 233–61 and 
accompanying text. At the least, such a concession would again signal that the majority voting norm is 
not a mere default rule subject to freestyle modification under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. See 
supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text. But if that is so, why should the majority voting norm 
operate as only a half-default rule—permitting self-imposed supermajority voting requirements while 
precluding submajority voting rules promulgated under the same supposed grant of authority? To say the 
least, these difficulties cut against acceptance of the Any-Voting-Number Theory. 
189  See King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 176–77 (noting that some applications of the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory would “[o]bviously . . . make a mockery . . . of . . . any notion of 
democracy”). 
190  See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 489 & n.31 (acknowledging that the Any-Voting-
Number Theory could produce a “proliferation” of supermajority voting rules on different subjects as 
well as rules that establish “unusual or odd proportions” to pass laws; also claiming, however, that 
“[o]ne would expect a chamber to choose round numbers” in part “to avoid . . . ridicule” (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
191  That theory, for example, welcomes congressional establishment of supermajority rule for 
enacting tax laws. But is a user fee a tax? Fines, penalties, or interest provisions associated with the 
nonpayment of taxes? Always? Which ones? It is telling in this regard that Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport acknowledge the value of certainty in this area by arguing that the approach offered here 
should be rejected in part because it involves a “subjective standard” that would “create chaos” as to 
“what rules were valid.” McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 484. The approach offered here, 
however, is of a distinctly bright-line nature because it targets only rules that, in explicit numerical 
terms, require a submajority or a supermajority vote to pass laws. Whether this principle reaches other 
supermajority devices, such as the Senate’s filibuster rules, is an entirely separate question. See 
Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 88 (distinguishing filibuster rules because they do “not purport to alter the 
Constitution’s rules of recognition” (emphasis omitted)). Even if it is thus applicable, however, such a 
conclusion would hardly breed “chaos”; it would simply breed a change in Senate filibuster practice. In 
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These problems are all the more acute because bill-related voting-
number requirements are rules of recognition—that is, part of the 
foundational body of law that determines whether new rights and duties 
have been created at all. The Framers appreciated that rules of recognition 
call for the highest levels of clarity and ease of application.192 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court in Chadha trumpeted exactly this point. There, as we have 
seen, the question was whether Congress could establish a procedure that 
permitted one or both chambers to overturn rules promulgated by agencies 
without presentment to the President. Highlighting the value of simplicity in 
rules of recognition, the Court scuttled this “political invention”193 because 
it conflicted with the Framers’ “single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure” for enacting laws.194 
The procedure for enacting laws envisioned by the Any-Voting-
Number Theory was not “exhaustively considered” by the Framers; indeed, 
the Framers never considered it at all.195 Nor is that procedure either 
“single” or “finely wrought.” Instead, the Any-Voting-Number Theory 
would tolerate a crazy quilt of voting rules in the House and yet another 
crazy quilt in the Senate. There is no evidence anywhere that the Framers 
favored such an ahistorical and complicated approach to formulating rules 
of recognition. The value of legal clarity thus conjoins with the wisdom of 
avoiding absurd results to confirm that the Framers’ embraced a system of 
acting on all bills by simple majority vote.196 
B. Republicanism 
The foregoing discussion shows why the Any-Voting-Number Theory 
trenches on a settled norm of parliamentary practice, as well as background 
legal doctrines that the Framers knew well. The Framers, however, were not 
only learned in the law. They were also students of philosophy. Indeed, they 
 
any event, operative legal principles cannot be ignored simply because honoring them involves 
disruption of currently prevailing practices. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
192  See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 167 (statement of John Dickinson) (favoring the 
authority of Congress to reject state laws in all cases rather than some because “[h]e thought the danger 
greater” from a choice “[t]o leave the power doubtful,” thus “opening another spring of discord”). See 
generally Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 636 
(1987) (emphasizing the need for “principles of authoritative determination” to be “clear and settled,” so 
that “a legal order can operate . . . smoothly”); McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 500 
(recognizing that “formal and determinate rules” are “particularly necessary” in “assessing the 
constitutionality of rules that determine whether congressional legislation is law”). 
193  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194  Id. at 951; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–40 (1998) (reaffirming 
importance of a “finely wrought” constitutional lawmaking process in invalidating Congress’s vesting of 
a “line item veto” power in the President). 
195  See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
196  See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 3, at 5 (concluding that Rule XXI(5)(c) is inconsistent with 
Chadha). 
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were philosophers who lived in an age of unequaled achievement in fertile 
reflection on the nature of political institutions. 
What values marked the political philosophy of the Framers? Above all 
else, they devoted themselves to the cause of republican self-rule. What is 
more, their devotion to this idea was acutely personal and intense, because 
family members, colleagues, neighbors, and friends had fought and died for 
this cause. As a result, a commitment to republicanism lay at the root of 
everything the Framers did—so much so that “the general form and aspect 
of the government” had to be “strictly republican” because “no other form 
would be reconcileable with the genius of the people of America; with the 
fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that honorable 
determination, which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our 
political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.”197 
As Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 39: “If the plan of the Convention 
therefore be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates 
must abandon it as no longer defensible.”198 
What, in the Framers’ view, was the relationship between republican 
self-rule and legislative majoritarianism? On this point, we have powerful 
evidence. In The Federalist, Madison reflected with care on the place of 
supermajority voting rules in the American system. He began his analysis in 
his most famous essay, No. 10, by explaining that “[w]hen a majority is 
included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to 
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights 
of other citizens.”199 (Note here the underlying assumption that majority 
factions will be able to oppress minorities precisely because they will wield 
power by majority vote.) According to Madison, it followed that: “To 
secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a 
faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular 
government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are 
directed . . . .”200 (Note again that the “danger of such a faction” was the 
danger of oppression by way of majority vote.) 
Madison’s musings did not stop there. He went on to prescribe an 
antidote to the maladies posed by majority factions. That antidote did not 
involve supermajority voting rules for an obvious reason: such majority-
defeating requirements were in their nature incompatible with “the spirit 
and the form of popular government.”201 Instead, the proper cure for 
 
197  THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 9, at 250 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
198  Id. 
199  Id. NO. 10, at 60–61 (James Madison). 
200  Id. at 61. 
201  Id. This is so because, in the minds of the Framers, popular sovereignty and majority rule were 
inextricably interlinked. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 141, at 760 (emphasizing that “republican 
principles,” deemed critical by Madison and others, “were rooted in majority rule popular sovereignty” 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 9, at 291 (James Madison)) (internal quotation mark 
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majoritarian overreaching began with the idea that “the majority, having 
such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and 
local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of 
oppression.”202 Put another way, generous portions of government power 
were to be channeled to the expansive republic that was the nation, within 
which many interests would clash; stable majorities would be hard to form; 
and nefarious plans of factional abuse would be hard to hatch because they 
would be hard to hide.203 In addition, formation of the large republic would 
lead to creation of populous voting districts that in turn would produce 
leaders best situated to withstand the shortsighted pressures of powerful 
demagogic movements.204 Finally, structural components of the self-
governing unit—such as the separation of federal powers, the requirement 
of congressional bicameralism, and the retention of states as competing 
centers of loyalty and power—would cut down the risk that a “sudden 
breese of passion” or “transient impulse” would lead to majority oppression 
of helpless minorities.205 As Madison observed in concluding No. 10: “In 
the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a 
Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican 
Government.”206 
Proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory try to tap into this 
rhetoric by arguing that one part of the “structure of the Union” that offered 
a “remedy” for majority misdeeds lay in the power of the House and the 
Senate to place supermajority voting constraints upon themselves. The flaw 
in this argument is that it does not propose a “Republican remedy” for the 
diseases of majority faction; instead it proposes what is in its nature a 
counter-Republican remedy. What is more, it propounds a structural check 
on majority tyranny that the authors of The Federalist, who were all but 
obsessive about this topic, never paused to mention—or even hint at—as 
being part of the constitutional plan. Most important of all, this argument 
fails to appreciate what the Framers did say about restraints on majority 
voting, including as a curative for majority abuses. 
 
omitted)); King, Deconstructing Gordon, supra note 6, at 133 (“[P]opular sovereignty [is] a notion that 
gains practical currency through the fundamental principle of majority rule.” (footnote omitted)). James 
Wilson made much the same point at the Pennsylvania ratification convention. Regarding our 
government, he declared, “Who are the majority in this assembly? Are they not the people?” Remarks of 
James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 62, at 550, 553. Turning to the constitutional plan, he declared that “the Congress” was “to be a 
faithful representative of the people”—that is, both as to the people as whole (in the House) and to the 
people as state-defined groups (in the Senate). Speech of James Wilson in the Philadelphia State House 
Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 167, 169. 
202  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 61 (James Madison). 
203  Id. at 62. 
204  Id. at 63. 
205  Id. NO. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton). 
206  Id. NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
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Madison turned to these matters in The Federalist No. 58. He 
recognized there that rules that, “in particular cases, if not in all,” call for 
“more than a majority of a quorum for a decision” could have produced 
“some advantages.”207 In particular, such supermajority voting rules “might 
have” provided “another obstacle . . . to hasty and partial measures.”208 The 
problem was that “these considerations are outweighed by the 
inconveniencies in the opposite scale.”209 Worries arose in part from the 
practical consequences that any supermajority voting rule could have, 
particularly because “an interested minority might take advantage of it to 
screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in 
particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.”210 But that was 
not the worst of it: “In all cases where justice or the general good might 
require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the 
fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be 
no longer the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to 
the minority.”211 
Close attention to the precise wording of Madison’s statement is well 
advised. Speaking directly about how “new laws” were “to be passed,” the 
Father of the Constitution did not say that legislative majoritarianism was 
merely important; he declared the principle to be “fundamental.” Nor did he 
say that legislative majoritarianism was supported by one of several 
fundamental principles; instead supermajority voting rules offended “the 
fundamental principle of free government.”212 Most important of all, 
Madison never stated or suggested that his paean to majority voting was 
aimed at justifying only a default rule. In all of this, as usual, Madison 
chose his words with care. And his message, rooted in foundational 
concerns, does not square with a system under which each chamber of 
Congress can dispense willy-nilly with legislative majoritarianism as the 
operative method for passing the laws of the land.213 
Madison’s reflections did not stand alone. Indeed, the republican line 
of thinking that he espoused pervaded the work of the framing period.214 
The delegates of the Philadelphia Convention, for example, had little 
 
207  Id. NO. 58, at 396 (James Madison). 
208  Id. at 396–97. 
209  Id. at 397. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. 
212  Id. (emphasis added). 
213  See, e.g., Lieber & Brown, supra note 86, at 2350 (reading THE FEDERALIST to show that the 
Framers “clearly contemplated” majority voting on all bills). 
214  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 141, at 765 (noting that “former Philadelphia Convention delegate 
Caleb Strong observed that ‘in republicks, the opinion of the majority must prevail’” (quoting RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 143 (1969))); supra note 156 (noting Jefferson’s 
endorsement of this view). See generally Amar, supra note 141, at 757 (“[T]his linkage between 
Republicanism and majority rule runs throughout . . . Founding era discourse more generally.”). 
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difficulty agreeing that members of the House should be elected by the 
people. The reason why, as James Wilson explained, was that it “will then 
come nearer to the will or sense of the majority.”215 Alexander Hamilton 
took a view of majority voting rules precisely parallel to that of Madison 
when he wrote that it is a “fundamental maxim of republican government, 
which requires that a sense of the majority should prevail.”216 Again, close 
attentiveness to Hamilton’s word choice is important. The maxim of 
majority rule of which Hamilton spoke was not just significant; it was 
“fundamental.” And, as with Madison, the majority-vote principle he 
endorsed was not put forward as only a weak default rule, but as a strong 
principle under which “the sense of the majority should prevail.”217 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport suggest that on close inspection 
these statements offer little useful insight into the Framers’ views on 
legislatively self-imposed nonmajority voting rules. They claim, for 
example, that the pronouncements of No. 58 are of limited significance 
because at the Convention “Madison argued for . . . a reversal [of the 
majority-vote norm] so many times that it is hard to credit that he believed 
it was fundamental.”218 On this point, McGinnis and Rappaport go several 
bridges too far. To the extent that Madison endorsed supermajority rules at 
the Convention, he did so—like other delegates—only for “special cases” 
that “merited special consideration.”219 His actions were thus entirely 
consistent with his later public assertions that legislative majoritarianism 
reflects a “fundamental principle.”220 In addition, while Madison advocated 
 
215  1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 142 (statement of James Wilson). 
216  THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 9, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton). 
217  Id. (emphasis added). For a similar view, see King, Use of Supermajority, supra note 6, at 390–
92. 
218  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 703, 720–21 (2002). 
219  Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers’ 
Intent, and the Judiciary’s Role, 100 DICK. L. REV. 341, 349–50 (1996). See generally infra note 220 
and accompanying text (detailing Madison’s proposals). 
220  THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 9, at 397 (James Madison). Careful consideration of 
Madison’s actions at the Constitutional Convention confirms this point. At one point, for example, 
Madison proposed a supermajority requirement for rejecting judicial appointments. 2 FARRAND, supra 
note 50, at 80 (statement of James Madison). On another occasion he proposed that Congress should be 
able to veto state laws by way of supermajority action. As with the Constitution’s treatment of expulsion 
and treaty ratification, however, these proposals did not involve ordinary lawmaking processes, and the 
latter proposal came only as a fallback after Madison’s initial proposal of a majority-vote congressional 
override of state laws ran into tough sledding. See 1 id. at 21 (setting forth paragraph 6 of the Virginia 
Plan). It is true that Madison, at one point, proposed a two-thirds voting rule for the taxation of exports. 
He did so, however, only as a “lesser evil than a total prohibition” on taxing exports, 2 id. at 363—an 
idea that was gaining momentum at the time (and, indeed, was ultimately successful) in the face of 
Madison’s vigorous pro-federal-power objections. This effort to secure half-a-loaf acceptance of the 
federal power to tax exports, subject to a supermajority constraint, shows nothing more than that, in this 
discrete context, Madison had to choose between: (1) his general commitment to legislative 
majoritarianism and (2) his all-out opposition to limiting the federal taxing power. That he chose as he 
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some supermajority rules, all of those rules were to be embedded in the 
Constitution itself221—consistent with the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation in 
Ballin that majority voting must control absent contrary instructions in the 
“organic law.”222 In any event, Madison set forth his views on the 
republican-centered fundamentality of majority voting both prominently 
and emphatically in The Federalist, which Supreme Court Justices and 
others have long looked to as a distinctly powerful indicator of the 
Constitution’s original meaning.223 
Advocates of the Any-Voting-Number Theory also offer a line of 
historical argument framed at the highest level of generality. They say this: 
Madison, Hamilton, and others did not specifically exclude the possibility 
of abandoning majority voting under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. At 
the same time, they endorsed all sorts of government structures designed to 
impede action by factious majorities, including presentment, bicameralism, 
and judicial review. As a result (the argument continues), we should be 
neither surprised nor troubled to discover within our system the additional 
 
did hardly reveals Madison to be a rabid antimajoritarian. The proper takeaway instead is that all the 
delegates—including Madison—viewed these supermajority voting proposals as exceptional, rather than 
routine, in nature.  
In any event, Madison’s entire constitutional philosophy was built on the principle of majority 
decisionmaking. Thus, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, he declared it to be “the republican principle” that 
the view of “less than a majority” can be defeated by “the majority . . . by regular vote.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9, at 60 (emphasis added). For further examples, see 1 FARRAND, supra 
note 50, at 318 (statement of James Madison) (“According to the Republican theory . . . , Right & 
power . . . [are] both vested in the majority . . . .”); id. at 315 (statement of James Madison) (suggesting 
during the Philadelphia Convention that under “the social compact of individuals . . . , a Majority would 
have a right to bind the rest”); CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 102, at 11 (noting 
that Madison consistently opposed state-based representation in the Senate because “it violated the vital 
republican principle of majority rule”); Amar, supra note 141, at 771 n.89 (noting that Madison in 
February 1787 declared that “the principles of Republican [Governments] . . . rest on the sense of the 
majority” (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 40 
(1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
221  See supra note 220. 
222  See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
223  See generally Dan T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and 
Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 471–73 (2006) (detailing extensive 
reliance on THE FEDERALIST, including by the Supreme Court). Notably, Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport take aim at THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 in part by claiming that “in other parts of The Federalist, 
Madison was not at all enthusiastic about simple majority rule.” McGinnis & Rappaport, Our 
Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 218, at 721. This statement, however, seeks to pare an apple 
when the matter at hand involves peeling an orange. Of course, Madison was not “enthusiastic about 
simple majority rules,” particularly in systems modeled after the Greek city-states. See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 10, supra note 9, at 61 (James Madison) (declaring that such polities “have ever been spectacles of 
turbulence and contention” and “as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths”). His 
statements in NO. 58, however, have nothing to do with that subject. Rather, these statements focus on 
the voting rules of legislative bodies that operate within a republican system—that is, a system that 
should, can, and does constrain “simple majority rule” through use of checking-and-balancing 
structures. These were the tools with which Madison sought to combat the excesses of majorities—not 
by fostering the abandonment of majority voting, which he viewed as the cornerstone of republicanism. 
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protective mechanism of permitting the legislative branches to impose on 
themselves supermajority voting restrictions.224 
This argument, however, fails to take account of the Framers’ intensely 
republican frame of mind. If the Framers’ only goal had been to check risks 
posed by oppressive majorities, supermajority voting rules would be fine. 
But checking oppressive majorities was not the Framers’ only goal. Of far 
greater salience was the plan to construct a government consistent with the 
republican form, including the “republican principle, which enables the 
majority to defeat [the minority’s] sinister views by regular vote.”225 Simply 
put, it offends republican principles to govern under voting rules by which 
power is “transferred to the minority.”226 Indeed, that is precisely why the 
Framers had to erect checking mechanisms other than supermajority voting 
rules as tools for controlling majoritarian excess.227 
The critical point is that all these other mechanisms were themselves 
consistent with the republican form. American-style bicameralism and 
presentment (unlike British-style bicameralism and presentment) were 
republican in nature because they channeled authority to decisionmakers 
who were accountable either directly or indirectly to the people themselves. 
The creation of large voting districts was republican in nature because, 
within those districts, it was the people themselves who voted. Even judicial 
review was republican in nature because, as Hamilton famously explained 
in The Federalist No. 78, the foundational choices made by “We the 
People” required effective protection over time.228 All of these innovations 
thus worked within the republican form to check the risks of majority 
tyranny. They did not depart from the republican form by inviting 
 
224  Professors McGinnis and Rappaport, for example, defend the Any-Voting-Number Theory in 
part on the ground that “[b]icameralism and the separation of powers make it difficult for mere 
majorities to pass legislation.” McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 508. Professors Fisk and 
Chemerinsky try to launch the same boat, arguing that “[a]lmost all of the institutions created by the 
Framers of the Constitution reflect a distrust of majorities.” Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 244; 
see also Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 264 (statement of Professor Gerhardt). As explained here, 
that is precisely the point: The very norm—and thus the risk—of majoritarian legislating provided the 
cause for the Framers to check the lawmaking process through the construction of other “institutions” 
also founded on republican principles. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 525 (“[P]ointing out that the 
Constitution contains anti-majoritarian elements does not prove that it contains no majoritarian 
ones. . . . [T]he Framers . . . may well have wanted simple majority voting rules even though they 
adopted other undemocratic structures.”). There is another point, too: If we need to pull out all the stops 
to interpret the Constitution to attend to our “distrust of majorities,” Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, 
at 244, why should we trust majorities to establish supermajority (and submajority!) voting rules? 
225  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 9 at 60 (James Madison). 
226  Id. NO. 58, at 397 (James Madison). 
227  See Norman R. Williams II, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial 
Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 971–74 (1994). 
228  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 9, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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legislative self-imposition of nonmajoritarian—and thus nonrepublican—
voting rules for enacting ordinary laws.229 
Proponents of the Any-Voting-Number Theory are sure to claim that 
this analysis undervalues Congress’s “ultimate” ability to repeal 
supermajority voting rules by majority vote.230 They may also posit that 
philosophical musings, even from the framing period, are too abstract to be 
of much help in resolving the specific question considered here. In the face 
of these possibilities, it is worth circling back to Madison. In The Federalist 
No. 54, the great Framer moved from theory to law. Summarizing how 
congressional lawmaking would work, he wrote in simple terms: “Under 
the proposed Constitution, the federal acts . . . will depend merely on the 
majority of votes in the Federal Legislature . . . .”231 This pronouncement 
throws a penetrating beam across our subject. A constitutional system under 
which the fate of “federal acts . . . will depend merely on the majority of 
votes in the Federal Legislature” is simply irreconcilable with a vacillating 
default-rule approach under which Congress may dictate that proposed bills 
will not become law even when they do secure “the majority of votes.”232 
C. Experience-Based Repudiation of Supermajority Voting Rules 
The Framers’ rejection of supermajority voting rules did not spring 
solely from parliamentary postulates or deep philosophical commitments to 
the cause of republicanism. It also reflected focused goals born of practical 
concerns. Federal and state authorities launched the Convention of 1787 
because, by then, there existed a national consensus that the Articles of 
Confederation were in need of extensive repair. There was a consensus, too, 
 
229  To be sure, in few instances, the Framers imposed supermajority voting rules, but that fact does 
not compromise their strong overarching republican outlook, especially with regard to the ordinary 
process of enacting legislation. Supermajority voting rules for treaty ratification and constitutional 
amendment, for example, dealt with exceptional matter on their face. And supermajority voting for 
impeachment convictions involved a quasi-judicial action not far removed from the actions of petit 
juries, which historically had acted by way of supermajority (indeed, unanimous) consensus, rather than 
simple majority vote. 
230  See McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 490 (claiming that Madison was addressing only 
the question of “a constitutional supermajority requirement” and not “a legislative supermajority 
requirement”). Along these lines, in a particularly important passage, Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport insist that “While constitutional supermajority requirements conflict with majority rule, 
legislative supermajority requirements do not. A legislative supermajority rule simply involves a 
majority imposing a supermajority requirement upon itself until the majority decides to eliminate it.” Id. 
at 491. This assertion is question-begging. One might say in the same vein, that the grant to Congress of 
legislative power necessarily carries with it a legislative power to give the legislative power away—
particularly since Congress could always reclaim its legislative power by exercising its “ultimate” 
legislative power to do so. Under the most basic of constitutional principles, however, such a default-
rule view of the legislative power is untenable. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–39 
(1998). 
231  THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 9, at 371 (James Madison). 
232  Id.  
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on the most basic problems. Above all else, the Articles had produced a 
federal government that was “frail,”233 “destitute of energy,”234 and marked 
by such an “intrinsic feebleness”235 that it had become wholly “inadequate 
to the purpose it was intended to answer.”236 
Although several problems contributed to the “inefficacy”237 of the 
Confederation Congress, one source of difficulty was well understood by 
all. Even as the Articles vested Congress with a number of major powers—
including the powers to requisition funds, to raise armies, to borrow money, 
to make treaties, to issue coinage, and to govern western lands238—they 
simultaneously provided that that body could act on most important matters 
only by way of supermajority vote.239 The results were not surprising. The 
Confederation Congress confronted difficulty in passing any laws at all.240 
And when it had no choice but to act—for example, in demanding needed 
monies from the states—it was routinely subjected to holdout moves by 
groups of state representatives driven by parochial concerns. The result of 
this system was not only stasis but “imbecility”241 and “a deep and solemn 
conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is 
essential.”242 
Many of the delegates who attended the Philadelphia Convention had 
served in the Confederation Congress. They had experienced firsthand the 
debilitating consequences of supermajority voting rules,243 and this 
 
233  Id. NO. 15, at 98 (Alexander Hamilton). 
234  Id. at 93. 
235  Id. NO. 22, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton). 
236  Id. NO. 2, at 10 (John Jay). See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 359 (1969) (“By the middle eighties Congress had virtually ceased trying to 
govern.”). 
237  THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 9, at 3 (Alexander Hamilton). 
238  See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, paras. 4–5. 
239  See id., art. IX, para. 6 (requiring a vote of nine states on these matters); see also McGinnis & 
Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 218, at 724 (“Because the states feared that 
the national government would displace their authority, they insisted that the Articles of Confederation 
require that Congress secure a supermajority before it could take most important actions.”). 
240  For one account of the adverse effects of supermajority voting rules, see JILLSON & WILSON, 
supra note 140, at 138–45, 191–92 (1994). 
241  THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 9, at 92 (Alexander Hamilton). 
242  Id. NO. 26, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton). As early as 1783, Hamilton had written that 
supermajority rules under the Articles had been “destructive of vigor, consistency, or expedition in the 
administration of affairs; tending to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority, by putting it 
in the power of a small combination to retard, and even to frustrate, the most necessary measures.” 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Resolutions for a General Convention, in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 269, 273 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. Trow 1850). 
243  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 144, at 51 (“The delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
knew full well from their experiences in the Continental Congresses that requiring supermajorities was a 
recipe for stalemate and indecision.”); Roberts, supra note 11, at 528 (“The leaders of the Convention, 
who had been members of the Confederation Congress, were . . . frustrated by the supermajority voting 
rule that governed its operation.”); see also King, Use of Supermajority, supra note 6, at 388 
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experience had predictable results. The idea of carrying over the Articles’ 
system of supermajority voting to the new federal Congress never drew 
even a fleeting interest. On only one occasion—when Hugh Williamson 
took the floor on June 6, 1787—was it hinted that a generalized two-thirds 
voting rule perhaps should be installed.244 The response to this overture was 
deafening silence.245 No delegate even seconded the motion, and neither 
Williamson nor any of his colleagues again propounded any remotely 
comparable idea. In the face of this history, the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory would permit either chamber to impose supermajority voting rules 
to pass any and all forms of legislation. There is no evidence that the 
Framers ever imagined such a thing.246 Indeed, the delegates offered only a 
limited number of serious bill-passing supermajority-vote proposals, and 
the unbroken consistency with which they were repudiated stands at odds 
with the Any Voting-Number Theory. 
It is telling in this regard that no delegate ever argued for anything like 
that theory, even though opportunities to do so arose on a recurring basis. 
No one said, in effect: “Even if we reject your proposed supermajority 
voting rule, either house of Congress can impose that rule if it sees a need 
to do so under the conditions it then confronts. That possibility should give 
us at least a measure of comfort in not constitutionalizing your proposed 
supermajority rule for all time in all circumstances.”247 What the Framers’ 
statements do reveal is that they rejected supermajority voting requirements 
for the most simple of reasons: Their experience convinced them that 
having such rules was a terrible idea. Roger Sherman declared that “to 
require more than a majority to decide a question was always 
embarrassing.”248 James Wilson agreed that “[g]reat inconveniences 
had . . . been experienced in Congress from the article of confederation 
requiring nine votes in certain cases.”249 In short, the Framers “repeatedly 
 
(highlighting Madison’s experiencing of these frustrations). In THE FEDERALIST, Alexander Hamilton 
drew on the history of supermajority rules both around the world and under the Articles of 
Confederation to reinforce the notion that they did not work in practice. As he explained:  
[T]he history of every political establishment in which this principle has prevailed is a history of 
impotence, perplexity and disorder. Proofs of this position might be adduced from the examples of 
the Roman tribuneship, the Polish diet and the states general of the Netherlands; did not an 
example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 9, at 507–08 (Alexander Hamilton). 
244  See 1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 140 (statement of Hugh Williamson). 
245  Id. 
246  See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
247  See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 814–15 (1995) (“The failure of intelligent 
and experienced advocates to utilize this argument must reflect a general agreement that its premise was 
unsound . . . .”). 
248  2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 450 (statement of Roger Sherman). 
249  Id. at 451 (remarks of James Wilson). The same themes were sounded by delegates to the 
ratification conventions. See, e.g., Remarks of Alexander Hamilton to the New York Convention (July 2, 
1788), in 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2074 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) 
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cited the supermajority requirements of the Articles as a source of 
frustration and ineffectiveness.”250 This history is of great importance, for it 
is all but unthinkable that those who wrote and ratified our Constitution 
meant to provide each legislative chamber with the power to adopt the very 
sort of rules they denounced as deeply, if not catastrophically, improvident. 
The Federalist drives home this conclusion. In No. 22, Hamilton took 
aim at supermajority voting rules. He noted that these rules had been 
defended (as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have more recently 
defended them) on the ground they “would contribute to security” by 
inhibiting excessive and overbearing legislation.251 Drawing on the lessons 
of the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton declared that supermajority 
voting “in practice has an effect, the reverse of what is expected from it in 
theory.”252 More particularly, with supermajority rules: 
[W]e are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be 
likely to be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how 
much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be 
necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which 
they may happen to stand at particular periods.253 
Hamilton especially feared that: 
If a pertinacious minority can controul the opinion of a majority respecting the 
best mode of conducting it; the majority in order that something may be done, 
must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller 
number will over-rule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national 
proceedings.254 
Such rules would give rise to “tedious delays—continual negotiation and 
intrigue—[and] contemptible compromises of the public good.”255 
 
(“[T]he Major will should be left open to make the defence and assert the Rights” of the nation; 
supermajority voting rules “must not fetter the Govermt.”); Remarks of Governor Edmund Randolph to 
the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 970, 987 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (criticizing the Articles’ supermajority voting rules 
because they “prevent energy . . . even in cases wherein the existence of the community depends on 
vigor and expedition”); Remarks of John Jay to the New York Convention (July 2, 1788), in 22 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 2058, 2071 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (“It is 
unwise to le[a]ve the Volition of the whole to be controuled by a part . . . .” (alteration in original)). 
250  Teter, supra note 41, at 570; accord, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 528–29 (noting that 
“[t]hroughout the Convention, in private letters, and in the ratification debates, [the Framers] bemoaned 
the effect of supermajority voting under the Articles” and that this fact “should be given much greater 
weight than it has traditionally been given” in evaluating the legality of supermajority voting rules). 
251  THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 9, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton). 
252  Id. 
253  Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted). 
254  Id. 
255  Id. 
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Worse yet was the risk of legislative stalemate: 
[I]n such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: 
For upon some occasions, things will not admit of accommodation; and then 
the measures of government must be injuriously suspended or fatally defeated. 
It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the 
necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always 
savour of weakness—sometimes border upon anarchy.256 
As a New York representative in the Confederation Congress, 
Hamilton had seen the impact of supermajority rules, and his declamations 
of them came with unrelenting vigor. Those rules portended not only 
“contemptible compromises” but “anarchy.”257 Their effect was to subject 
“the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority” to the 
“caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto.”258 
Hamilton set his gaze on how supermajority voting rules worked “in 
practice,” “in reality,” and in “real operation.”259 His conclusion was that 
these rules were not just ill-advised; they were “poison.”260 These 
ruminations led Hamilton to conclude—in terms charged with significance 
for the constitutional question now under consideration—that “all 
provisions which require more than the majority of any body to its 
resolutions have a direct tendency to embarrass the operations of the 
government.”261 
This history highlights two points of significance. First, the Framers 
condemned the use of supermajority voting requirements for making 
ordinary laws in the most forceful terms. Second, because they had lived in 
close quarters with these rules’ doleful consequences, they sought to fend 
off the dangers that such rules posed in a highly purposeful and self-aware 
way. These facts clash with the Any-Voting-Number Theory for the simple 
reason that constitutional interpretation must take account of the Framers’ 
known aims.262 Given the Framers’ focused goal of safeguarding the system 
from the ill effects of supermajority voting rules, there is no good reason to 
opt for a theory that invites their widespread use (that is, the Any-Voting-
Number Theory) over one that excises them from the lawmaking process 
(that is, the theory of strict and consistent majoritarianism advocated here). 
 
256  Id.. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. at 140. 
259  Id. 
260  Id. 
261  Id. NO. 75, at 507 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
262  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 347 (“Arguments from purpose are . . . essential 
to resolving [constitutional] ambiguities . . . .”). 
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D. The Politics of the Framing and Supermajority Voting Rules 
Looking back on more than 230 years of self-rule under a single 
charter of government, citizens of today may be tempted to underestimate 
the din of contentiousness that pervaded the Philadelphia Convention. In 
fact, that gathering was a fractious and tense affair. It lasted four months. 
Time and again, the threat of impasse loomed. At the end, leading delegates 
refused to sign the Constitution, and others would have joined the dissenters 
had they not already headed home in disgust.263 
This level of testiness should not be surprising. Precisely because the 
Convention attracted leading statesmen of the day, strongly held views were 
commonplace and not easily remolded by the guiding hand of two or three 
dominating figures. The delegates, moreover, came from different states 
with different economies, geographies, cultures, histories, and problems.264 
Out of the resulting swirl of ever-clashing interests came sometimes-
immobilizing discord. How was the Gordian Knot of irreconcilable conflict 
cut? In Philadelphia in 1787—as in many times and places—the liberating 
saber blow came from political compromise. And, as it turns out, each of 
the two greatest compromises reached by the Convention undermines the 
Any-Voting-Number Theory. 
1. The Slave Trade–Navigation Act Compromise.—One compromise 
reached at the Convention specifically concerned supermajority voting 
rules. More than two months into the proceedings, controversy erupted 
when the Committee on Detail floated the idea that so-called navigation 
acts should be subject to enactment only by a two-thirds vote.265 This 
initiative reflected the fears of southern delegates that the new Congress 
would channel the carriage of southern agricultural exports away from 
cheaper European ships to more costly American ships that operated out of 
the northern states.266 Not surprisingly, northern delegates recoiled at this 
proposed restriction. In the end, however, they could avoid its inclusion in 
the Constitution only by swallowing the bitter pill of agreeing to afford 
constitutional protection to the slave trade for twenty more years.267 The pill 
was bitter because many northern delegates passionately opposed that 
barbaric practice268 and because the deep southern states had pushed their 
position on this matter to the point of a strident ultimatum.269 In the end, 
 
263  See, e.g., DAN T. COENEN, THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: HOW HAMILTON AND MADISON 
RECONCEIVED AMERICA 3–4 (2007). 
264  See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 102, at 8. 
265  See STEWART, supra note 82, at 173. 
266  Id. 
267  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. V.  
268  See STEWART, supra note 82, at 194. 
269  2 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 373 (statement of John Rutledge) (“If the Convention thinks that 
[these states] will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation 
is vain. The people of those States will never be such fools . . . .”). 
106:1091  (2012) Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules 
 1145
however, intensely frustrated northern delegates acceded to the twenty-
year-rule because the issue had precipitated a near-month of deadlock and, 
when push came to shove, they assigned overriding importance to ensuring 
majority voting on navigation-act bills. As Maryland delegate Luther 
Martin later reported to his state legislature, the northern delegations were 
willing to allow a “liberty to prosecute the slave-trade, provided the 
southern States would, in their turn, gratify them, by laying no restriction on 
navigation acts.”270 
With this history in view, it is worth asking this question: In the early 
years of the Senate, could the six southern states—aided perhaps by roguish 
Rhode Island or section-straddling Delaware—have placed a “restriction on 
navigations acts” by adopting a rule that permitted their enactment only by 
a two-thirds vote?271 Contrary to the result dictated by the Any-Voting-
Number Theory, such a move would have departed from one of the 
Convention’s most hard-fought and important decisions. Put simply, the 
delegates who struggled to craft the slave-trade compromise surely would 
not have tolerated installation of the very supermajority rule that their 
solemn agreement emphatically repudiated.272 
2. The Great Compromise.—Most students learn that the 
Constitutional Convention’s critical moment came with the forging of the 
Great Compromise. They often do not learn, however, of the nearly 
paralyzing bitterness that marked the weeks that led up to establishment of 
our curiously constructed two-house Congress. In some respects, the Great 
Compromise was no compromise at all. From the outset of the Convention, 
there was broad agreement on the need to establish a bicameral legislature, 
with at least one chamber selected according to a principle of proportionate 
representation. The drafters of the discussion-shaping Virginia Plan, 
however, called for something more. In keeping with the principle that 
“[t]he majority of people wherever found ought in all questions to govern 
the minority,” they urged that the principle of proportionate representation 
 
270  3 id. app. A, at 211 (emphasis omitted). 
271  Notably, such an outcome, if constitutionally possible, might well have taken hold. See id. at 334 
(remarks of George Mason to the Virginia Convention) (opining that a majority of states at the 
Convention favored requiring a two-thirds majority to pass navigation acts “till a compromise took place 
between the northern and southern states”). 
272  One might respond that this history establishes only that the Constitution bars self-imposed 
supermajority rules for navigation acts, without diminishing the chambers’ power to develop such rules 
in all other fields. Nothing whatsoever in the constitutional text, however, lends support to this oddly 
discriminatory approach, which also flies in the face of Oliver Ellsworth’s observation that the Framers 
rejected supermajority rules for navigation acts because they “ought to be left on the same footing with 
other national concerns.” Letter from Landholder VI to the Connecticut Courant (Dec. 10, 1788), in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 62, at 398, 399 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1983) (emphasis added); see also 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 1091, at 539 (noting that repudiation of the 
Navigation Act proposal reflected “the general impropriety of allowing the minority in a government to 
control, and in effect to govern all the legislative powers of the majority”). 
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must guide the structuring of the Senate as well as the House.273 Madison 
was adamant on this point, arguing that any departure from “the doctrine of 
proportional representation” was “evidently unjust.”274 
As the Convention wore on, small-state delegates became no less 
insistent in arguing against a federal legislature built solely on the principle 
of proportionate representation. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, for 
example, made the case for giving the states an “equality of voices” in the 
Senate so as “to secure the Small States [against] the large” and to make the 
Constitution “conformable to the federal principle” of equivalent state 
sovereignty then in place under the Articles of Confederation.275 The large-
staters responded with no less zeal by renewing their demands for 
proportionate representation. James Wilson framed the argument in 
pointedly mathematical terms when he urged that equal state representation 
in the Senate would permit “less than 1/3 [of the population] to overrule 2/3 
whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner.”276 
As this debate intensified, small-state delegates shocked the 
Convention by proposing the so-called New Jersey Plan.277 In effect, this 
proposal recommended abandoning most of what the Convention already 
had achieved. Instead of moving forward with a bicameral structure, it 
advocated a system built around the unicameral legislature already in place 
under the Articles, which afforded each state one vote.278 The divisiveness 
spawned by this game-changing gambit was nerve-rackingly intense.279 
In the war of words that followed, discussions took on a new level of 
sophistication that is of importance to the question under consideration 
here. In advocating state equality in the Senate, leaders of the small-state 
bloc emphasized that large states would never be exposed to small-state 
predation because the population-based House would provide them with 
protection against that risk. Virginia Plan advocates responded that this 
argument missed the critical point. From their perspective, the problem was 
not that the small states could oppress the large ones by crushing them with 
new pro-small-state laws. Rather, the problem was that the small states 
 
273  1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 605–06 (statement of James Wilson). 
274  Id. at 151 (statement of James Madison); see also id. at 37. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 167 (2d ed. 2005) (“[M]ost large state 
delegates arrived at the Convention determined that states would be proportionately represented in both 
houses of the new Congress.”).  
275  1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 468 (statement of Oliver Ellsworth); see id. at 469 (statement of 
Oliver Ellsworth) (“The power of self-defen[s]e was essential to the small States.”). 
276  Id. at 482–83 (statement of James Wilson). 
277  See id. at 242 (notes of James Madison). 
278  Id. 
279  Indeed, the escalating clash produced feelings so raw that on June 30, Delaware delegate 
Gunning Bedford, Jr. implied that, without equal state representation in the Senate, his state might not 
only abandon the Convention, but leave the union and “find some foreign ally of more honor and good 
faith.” 1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 492 (statement of Gunning Bedford, Jr.). 
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could use the Senate to impede needed reforms by blocking the enactment 
of laws put forward by the House. The primary spokesman for the large-
state cause was Wilson, who took pains to explain: 
It is true that a majority of States in the [second] branch can not carry a law 
[against] a majority of the people in the [first]. But this removes half only of 
the objection. Bad [governments] are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little. 
2. that which does too much: that which fails [through] weakness; and that 
which destroys [through] oppression. Under which of these evils do the 
[United] States at present groan? [U]nder the weakness and inefficiency of its 
[government]. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Convention. 
If the motion [for equal representation of the states in the Senate] should be 
agreed to, we shall leave the [United States] fettered precisely as heretofore; 
with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of ye fair 
representation of the people in the [first] branch, defeated in the [second].280 
It is telling that the small-state representatives did not contest most of 
Wilson’s reasoning. They did not challenge his premise that stasis had 
emerged as the primary problem under the Articles. They also did not 
question his belief that legislative inactivity was deeply inimical to the 
public good. They did, however, voice disagreement with one essential 
element of Wilson’s critique. It was Oliver Ellsworth who offered the 
decisive rebuttal when he declared that, under the Articles, “[n]o salutary 
measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States.”281 To anyone 
familiar with pre-Convention history, the thread of this argument was easy 
to follow: Although “salutary measure[s] . . . had been lost” in the 
Confederation Congress, this result was not attributable to the states’ equal 
representation; instead, the wishes of “a majority of the States” had been 
thwarted by structural problems—including (as we have seen) 
supermajority voting rules.282 Ellsworth said, in effect: “Yes, Mr. Wilson, 
there are serious problems with the way the Confederation Congress 
operates, including because of its inability to pass needed laws. Those 
problems, however, do not result from equal representation of the states in 
that body. So let’s create a Senate that retains equal state representation but 
gets rid of the structural defects. If we do that, even with a new 
constitutional requirement of bicameralism, legislative stasis will no longer 
be a problem.” 
By early July the delegates were so immobilized by this debate that 
they turned to the tool of last resort: They referred the matter to a 
 
280  Id. at 483–84 (statement of James Wilson) (footnotes omitted); accord 2 id. at 10–11 (statement 
of James Wilson) (reiterating that, with equality in the Senate, the “small States cannot indeed 
act, . . . but they may [control] the [government] as they have done” in the Confederation Congress, thus 
producing a system “having all the weakness of the former [government]”). 
281  1 id. at 484 (statement of Oliver Ellsworth) (emphasis omitted). 
282  See supra notes 237–42 and accompanying text. 
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committee.283 The committee in due course recommended that the Senate 
should, indeed, be constituted to provide equal state representation.284 Its 
report, however, oozed with unease. As committee member Elbridge Gerry 
explained: 
The Committee were of different opinions as well as the Deputations from 
which the [Committee] were taken, and agreed to the Report merely in order 
that some ground of accommodation might be proposed. Those opposed to the 
equality of votes have only assented conditionally; and if the other side do not 
generally agree will not be under any obligation to support the Report.285 
On July 16, after still more debate, the Convention approved the 
committee recommendation. The result of that vote, however, disclosed just 
how divisive the subject matter of the Great Compromise remained. Five 
states voted aye. Four states voted nay. And the delegates of the only other 
then-represented state found themselves evenly divided.286 
There are four key points to be gleaned from the story of the Great 
Compromise, each of which undermines the Any-Voting-Number Theory. 
First, the signature element of the bargain was its creation of a Senate in 
which the states would have an “equal voice.”287 Supermajority voting rules 
threaten this desideratum, however, because they give unequal 
decisionmaking rights to no-voting and yes-voting states.288 Indeed, in The 
Federalist, Madison made the critical point that true equality within the 
legislature results from majority voting. As he explained, under the 
Constitution, legislative enactments “will depend merely on the majority of 
votes in the Federal Legislature, and consequently each vote whether 
proceeding from a larger or a smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy 
or powerful, will have an equal weight.”289 If state equality lay at the core of 
the Great Compromise, and state equality hinges (as Madison posits) on the 
fact that acts “depend . . . on the majority of votes,” then rules that cause 
acts not to depend on a majority of votes erode state equality in a key 
constitutional sense. The Any-Voting-Number Theory thus contravenes the 
Great Compromise—and the structure of the Senate it established—because 
 
283  1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 516 (notes of James Madison). 
284  Id. at 526. 
285  Id. at 527 (statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
286  2 id. at 15 (notes of James Madison). In favor were Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New 
Jersey, and North Carolina. Opposed were Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
Massachusetts was equally divided. No Rhode Island delegates attended the Convention, and New 
Hampshire’s delegates arrived only later. As for New York, only four days before this decisive action, 
two of its three delegates had abandoned the Convention, thus stripping the state of the requisite quorum 
to vote. 
287  THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 9, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton). 
288  See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 166 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that a 60%-
supermajority voting rule gives opponents of a legal change “half again the voting power of 
proponents”). 
289  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 9, at 371 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
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that theory countenances creation of exactly these sorts of equality-
defeating rules.290 
Second, the Great Compromise was premised not only on state equality 
in the Senate, but on majority rule itself. The question with which the 
Framers grappled was whether (as captured in the words of Oliver 
Ellsworth) a “majority of the states”—even though containing only a 
minority of the overall population—could block the enactment of bills, 
including bills already passed by the more democratically accountable 
House.291 The world of the Any-Voting-Number Theory, however, is one in 
which the fate of bills can be subjected to the decision of a minority of the 
states through the Senate’s self-imposition of supermajority voting rules.292 
This is simply not how the Framers thought about the degree of potentially 
obstructive power the Constitution would give to the small states. In short, 
the Any-Voting-Number Theory departs from the basic majority-of-the-
states reasoning in which the Great Compromise was grounded. 
Third, even the argument for the Great Compromise made by the 
small-state contingent envisioned the rejection of decisional structures that 
would foster legislative inaction in the Senate. We have seen before that 
supermajority voting requirements were, standing alone, a key target of 
 
290  Defenders of the Any-Voting-Number Theory have challenged this line of reasoning—and the 
constitutional case against supermajority voting rules more generally—by invoking Gordon v. Lance, 
403 U.S. 1 (1971). See, e.g., Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 255–56, 266 (statement of Professor 
Gerhardt); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 244. In that case, the Court upheld a state-imposed 
requirement of a 60% vote to pass local referenda that authorized the issuance of bonded indebtedness 
and resulting tax increases, in the face of a challenge based on the one-person-one-vote principle. Much 
can be said about Gordon, but the main thing to say is that is has no application here. First, as a case that 
involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state law—which thus implicated critical federalism 
interests—Gordon casts no light on “the structural provisions of the Constitution that uniquely govern 
the operations of the federal government.” Cornyn, supra note 167, at 196 n.49. Second, the core 
rationale of Gordon went something like this: The well-recognized greater power of states to establish 
individual rights, designed to limit the choices of majorities within the state, should logically carry with 
it the lesser power to limit majority choices with regard to “certain decisions,” through imposition of 
supermajority voting rules. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 7. This rationale is beside the point here, however, for 
an obvious reason: In contrast to properly designated state bodies, neither the House nor the Senate can 
create constitutional rights (or any other rights) under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. And so, they 
cannot claim the power under that Clause to impose half-a-loaf rights, of the supermajority-voting-rule 
sort, under Gordon’s greater-state-power-includes-the-lesser-state-power theory. 
291  See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
292  It bears emphasis that it does not solve this problem to say that a majority of states have the 
“ultimate” authority to make and repeal supermajority voting rules. This is so because those rules can be 
put in place by blocs of states (such as the small states of 1789) in an effort to disadvantage another bloc 
of states (such as the large states in 1789) over time on a continuing basis. See infra note 295. To be 
systematically disadvantaged in this way is not to be accorded equality in the meaningful sense 
envisioned by the Great Compromise. To put the point another way, if a coalition of small states 
implements a supermajority voting rule designed to systematically disadvantage the large states, it will 
come as cold comfort for those large states to learn that they have “ultimate power” to try to form a rule-
repealing coalition with other states that, acting from self-interest, helped to put that very rule in place. 
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expungement by the Framers.293 What we see here is that elimination of 
those requirements was also an important ingredient of the Great 
Compromise. Oliver Ellsworth’s defense of that compromise rested on the 
idea that the new Senate would not labor under the impediments that had 
confounded enactment of federal laws under the Articles, including 
supermajority voting rules.294 This, then, was part of the trade-off the small 
states offered as part of the Great Compromise itself. As a result, 
recognition of a power to install supermajority voting rules in the Senate—
especially without approval of the far more representative House—would 
breach the essential bargain that brought the Constitution into being.295 
Finally, whatever else might be said about the Great Compromise, it 
was a compromise, and one that came into existence only (1) by the most 
razor-thin of margins, (2) in the face of fierce resistance, and (3) amid an 
atmosphere of agonizing skepticism in those delegations that represented a 
large majority of the people of the nation.296 The arguments that drove 
opposition to the Great Compromise were weighty; equal state 
representation in the Senate did stand at odds with both the all-men-are-
equal ideals of the Revolution and the rightness of taking at least some 
account of the distinct interests of the large and the growing states. To be 
sure, the representatives of those states agreed to sacrifice those values in an 
effort to form a more perfect union. But, fighting tooth and nail all the way, 
they sacrificed those values only as far as the Great Compromise reached. 
They neither did nor were expected by their fellow delegates to go one 
millimeter farther.297 
So what did they agree to? They agreed to a system under which, as 
James Wilson had explained it, representatives of only some 30% of the 
population could obstruct the legislative efforts of the remaining 70%.298 
And what did they not agree to? They never endorsed, nor would have 
endorsed, a system under which those same representatives of only 30% of 
the population could transfer controlling, lawmaking authority to 
 
293  See supra notes 234–62 and accompanying text. 
294  See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text. 
295  Nor was the danger of small-state power grabs a minor concern in 1787 and 1788. William 
Paterson, for example, saw Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania “as the three large States, and the 
other ten as small ones.” 1 FARRAND, supra note 50, at 178 (statement of William Paterson). It is no 
stretch, then, to believe that—if the Rules of Proceedings Clause let them—these ten states (or even 
seven of them) could have joined together to impose supermajority voting rules in the Senate, so as to 
safeguard their own interests over time against large-state dominance. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, 
supra note 9, at 392 (James Madison) (noting that in the Senate “the advantage will be in favor of the 
smaller states”); 2 STORY, supra note 45, § 887, at 354 (recognizing the Framers’ concerns about 
“inducements to improper combinations, either of the great states, or the small states, to accomplish 
particular objects”). 
296  See supra notes 273–80, 283–86 and accompanying text. 
297  See Roberts, supra note 11, at 546 (“The balance [the Framers] struck was hard-fought and 
specific, certainly not an open-ended invitation to continue to expand the power of small states.”). 
298  See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
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representatives of only 20% or 10% of the population. The small-state 
delegates, in the end, were able to create a Senate based on a “majority of 
the states” voting system, despite nearly intractable opposition.299 With this 
point in view, the only fair inference is that the sort of double-dipping, 
deeply republicanism-diminishing, minority-of-the-states approach to 
Senate voting that the Any-Voting-Number Theory imagines would never 
have had the blessing of those who framed the Convention’s Great 
Compromise.300 
 
 * * * 
 
For all of the reasons marshaled in Part III, the Any-Voting-Number 
Theory stands at odds with our constitutional history. The Framers were 
legalists. They were philosophers. They were problem solvers. And they 
were politicians thrown into a hornets’ nest of controversy that proved 
escapable only by way of hard-won compromises. What is determinative—
and, indeed, remarkable—is that, in each of these four separate roles, the 
Framers embraced as a constitutional requisite a fixed norm of legislative 
majoritarianism with regard to the ordinary enactment of laws. Proponents 
of the Any-Voting-Number Theory ask this question: If the Framers were 
so committed to legislative majoritarianism, why did they not write into the 
Constitution that neither the House nor the Senate possesses power under 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause to reject majority voting as the means of 
acting on bills? The history recounted here offers the most plausible 
answer: The Framers so incontrovertibly embraced an unabridgeable 
principle of majority voting that this question did not occur to them as even 
meriting serious attention.301 
 
299  See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
300  The same conclusion is supported by Bondurant, supra note 45, at 484 (claiming that “[t]hrough 
the Great Compromise, the Framers intended to vest Senate decisionmaking power in a majority of 
states, whose legislatures elected a majority of senators,” but that supermajority voting “shifts political 
power in the Senate in favor of a minority of states by reducing from twenty-five to twenty-one the 
number of states whose senators can block a bill”). 
301  See Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 41 Before the S. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 103d Cong. 87 (1994) (statement of Professor Charles Fried, Harvard Law School) 
(“Majority rule is so basic a principle of our Constitution that it is nowhere stated explicitly, but 
pervades the whole document.”); see also Roberts, supra note 11, at 527 (acknowledging, after a review 
of relevant history, that the “Framers may well have thought that such a majority voting rule was 
perfectly obvious and did not merit specific mention”). Indeed, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport 
themselves rely on a closely related idea in their own analysis, claiming that the chambers’ ultimate 
power to change rules (including supermajority voting rules) by majority vote “was not made explicit” 
in the constitutional text “because the Framers did not appear to consider it an open question.” McGinnis 
& Rappaport I, supra note 6, at 487 n.17. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport are right to recognize 
that, for the Framers, some voting rules did not present “an open question.” Contrary to their claim, 
however, one such rule is the one defended in this article—namely, that laws are to be passed according 
to majority vote. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is an inherent difficulty in making the case for a single 
constitutional rule in a sixty-two-page article, especially one that advances 
no fewer than three textual arguments, four historical arguments, and a 
multi-pronged structural argument that (among other things) asserts the 
inapplicability of the key constitutional clause invoked on behalf of the 
opposing position. The difficulty is that one’s critics are sure to say: Thou 
“doth protest too much.”302 
Readers can and will reach their own conclusions as to whether the 
elaborateness of the argument offered here reveals it to be comprehensive 
and forceful or strained and overreaching. Either way, this treatment may 
serve the useful end of laying bare what originalist arguments there are in 
support of a binding norm of legislative majoritarianism. At the least, this 
paper reflects a long-overdue effort to take up the challenge laid down by 
Any-Voting-Number Theory proponents for others to address their 
originalist arguments in a full-blown way.303 
Even so, the “doth protest too much” suggestion rightly reminds us to 
be careful about losing the forest for the trees. The large questions 
addressed here are these: What is more important? To give our legislative 
chambers, under the once-little-noticed Rules of Proceedings Clause, 
sweeping powers to depart from more than 200 years of uninterrupted 
practice by adopting all manner of submajority and supermajority voting 
rules? Or to honor those foundational principles—rooted in text, structure, 
parliamentary practice, republican governance, practical problem solving, 
and hard-won compromise—on which the entire legislative edifice was 
built? To ask these questions is to answer them, and to show why the Any-
Voting-Number Theory departs from the command of our Constitution. 
That command is simple and strong: A bill is passed by a house of 
Congress if, and only if, it receives a majority vote. 
 
 
302  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2. 
303  See McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 6, at 349. 
